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I. INTRODUCTION: PARTISAN ENTRENCHMENT
Five years ago, we offered a theory of how constitutional change and
constitutional revolutions occurred, which we called the theory of “partisan
entrenchment.”1 Much has happened in the subsequent half-decade, and we
are grateful for this opportunity to offer an update of our thoughts, together
with some amendments to our initial formulation. By far the most
important amendment is to draw out in more detail how the development of
constitutional doctrine by courts occurs within the broader framework of
changes in constitutional regimes, which include changes in institutions,
legislation, and administrative regulation. The forces of democratic politics
drive these regime changes, and the major actors are not courts but the
political branches. Although courts may initially resist these changes, in the
long run, they cooperate with them, shape their contours, and legitimate
them through the development of constitutional doctrine. In the second half
of this essay, we describe an emerging regime of institutions and practices
that we call the “National Surveillance State,” which, we think, represents
the major constitutional development of our era.
The National Surveillance State responds to the particular needs of
warfare, foreign policy, and domestic law enforcement in the twenty-first
century. That such a state is emerging has become clear in the wake of 9/11
and debates about the War on Terror. However, it is not limited to the
specific problems posed by terrorism, and key elements have been in place
for some time. The courts will help set the constitutional contours of the
National Surveillance State, but much of their work will consist of statutory
interpretation and administrative review. Most of the apparatus of the
National Surveillance State will be developed by Congress and particularly
by military and civilian bureaucracies within the executive branch.
Although in the past several years the Republican Party has had the primary
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. W.
St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr., Centennial Chair, University of Texas
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1. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1066 (2001).
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responsibility for shaping the institutions and practices of the National
Surveillance State, both major political parties will participate in its
construction. How the National Surveillance State develops will depend on
the contingencies of politics and the results of future elections, which, of
course, will produce new judicial appointments.2 The courts will bless and
legitimate these developments, much as they legitimated the rise of the
administrative and regulatory state and the national security state in the
middle of the twentieth century.
The initial formulation of our theory consisted of four basic points: (1)
by installing enough judges and Justices with roughly similar ideological
views over time, Presidents can push constitutional doctrine in directions
they prefer; (2) partly for this reason the Supreme Court tends, in the long
run, to cooperate with the dominant political forces of the day; (3) not all
Presidents are equally interested or equally effective in entrenching their
views in the judiciary, and Presidents face different opportunities and
obstacles that may enhance or limit their success; (4) finally, significant
changes in judicial doctrine usually reflect larger institutional changes—like
the growth of the administrative state—and broader political forces. We
now explain each of these features of our theory in more detail.
First, we have argued that constitutional revolutions occur through
“partisan entrenchment,” in which Presidents appoint judges and Justices to
the federal judiciary who are thought to share the broad political agenda of
the political party led by the President.3 When Presidents are able to
appoint enough such judges and Justices, constitutional doctrines start to
change. The pace of change is faster if many appointments are made in a
comparatively brief period of time. For example, the New Deal revolution
was the product not so much of Justice Owen Roberts’s switch in time in
1937 as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ability to appoint nine New Dealers to the
U.S. Supreme Court between 1937 and 1942,4 a task made far easier by the
2. As we shall describe, the transition towards the National Surveillance State began
during the Clinton Administration in the years immediately after the Cold War, as analysts
began to realize that non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda posed serious threats to American
national security. See, e.g., Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road
to 9/11, at 237-44 (2006).
3. As we discuss infra, Presidents have their own priorities, and they may decide to
emphasize some issues at the expense of others when they make appointments.
4. One of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s appointments, Wiley Rutlege, replaced a previous
Roosevelt appointee, James Byrnes, who left the U.S. Supreme Court in 1942 after only a
year in order to accept appointment as chief of the Office of Economic Stabilization and
then, in 1943, as head of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. “In short, FDR
let ‘assistant president’ Byrnes manage the home front while FDR managed the war.”
Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, http://www.nps.gov/elro/glossary/byrnesjames.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). Byrnes had hoped to become FDR’s running mate in
1944, but his antilabor and anti-civil rights positions ruled him out. Id. Following service as
Secretary of State under President Harry Truman, Byrnes returned home to South Carolina,
where he served as its segregationist governor from 1951-1955. Had Byrnes remained on
the Court, it would have been far more difficult for Chief Justice Earl Warren to secure a
unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Byrnes’s replacement, Rutledge, did not sit on the Court that decided Brown. He died
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fact that Democrats firmly controlled the Senate throughout this period. A
Supreme Court restocked with loyal New Dealers quickly reinterpreted the
Constitution to give the federal government wide-ranging powers to
regulate the national economy.
The practice of partisan entrenchment hardly begins with Roosevelt. The
notion that Presidents can promote their constitutional agendas through the
judiciary dates back at least to the Midnight Judges Act and John Adams’s
appointment of John Marshall as Chief Justice. In Marshall’s case,
however, Adams and the Federalists were attempting to entrench the
constitutional views of a party that was about to lose power. Roosevelt, by
contrast, sought to stock the courts with like-minded jurists who would
cooperate with his policies while he and his party remained in power. Thus,
“partisan entrenchment” captures both the idea of preserving a voice when
one loses elections and the idea of securing judicial allies who will work
with and bolster one’s existing political coalition. As we shall see later on,
the latter is the best account of President George W. Bush’s two Supreme
Court appointments.
In any case, Roosevelt’s attempt to entrench his policy goals through
judicial appointments was hardly an innovation. Indeed, President William
Howard Taft’s ability to name six Justices in his single term between 1909
and 1913 might well have postponed an earlier Progressive Era shift in
jurisprudence that we today might be calling the “Wilson Revolution”
rather than the Revolution of 1937. Hammer v. Dagenhart, after all, failed
by only one vote to uphold the federal child labor act.5 (Ironically enough,
that vote was provided by Wilson’s own appointee, Attorney General James
McReynolds, whose appointment some explain by reference to Wilson’s
desire to get the notoriously irascible McReynolds out of the Cabinet at any
cost.)6
The Warren Court “revolution” that stretched roughly between 1962 and
1969 offers an interesting variation on partisan entrenchment—a tipping
unexpectedly in 1949 at the age of 55, and was replaced by Sherman Minton, a loyal oneterm Democratic Senator from Indiana who lost reelection in 1940 and was appointed by
Roosevelt to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1941. Although Minton
joined the unanimous opinion in Brown, his voting record became conservative because he
was as deferential to the President and Congress on national security as he was on domestic
policy. See N.E.H. Hull, Sherman Minton, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court
649 (Kermit Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005). Rutledge, on the other hand, though an equally strong
proponent of the New Deal, was a far more ardent defender of civil liberties while on the
Court; he would probably have voted quite differently from Minton on a number of
significant cases that helped to legitimate the developing national security state. See William
Crawford Green, Wiley Blount Rutledge, Jr, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme
Court, supra, at 877-88. The history of this one seat underscores a theme that we emphasize
throughout this article—the importance of contingency in constitutional change.
5. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
6. Scot Powe has suggested in conversation that James McReynolds was a Wilsonian
“progressive” on the crucial issue (for the time) of antitrust policy. Mark Graber has also
pointed out that McReynolds largely shared Woodrow Wilson’s views on race. Hence,
Wilson might have had multiple motives for moving McReynolds from the Cabinet to the
Supreme Court.
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point phenomenon. The liberal Warren Court majority emerged from three
sources. The first consisted of liberal holdovers from previous democratic
administrations (Hugo Black and William O. Douglas). The second was
President John F. Kennedy’s ability to replace one of the most conservative
Democratic appointees (Felix Frankfurter)7 with one of the most liberal
(Arthur Goldberg) at roughly the same time that he was able to name the
moderately liberal—at least on issues of race and national power—Byron
White to replace the hapless Charles Whittaker.8 Interestingly enough, Earl
Warren and Douglas, who were consulted by Kennedy, advised against the
nomination of William Hastie, who would have become the first AfricanAmerican Justice, because he would be “just one more vote for
Frankfurter.”9 Goldberg, of course, would leave the Court to go to the
United Nations, but he was replaced by the equally liberal Abe Fortas, who
served until 1969, when he retired under the cloud of a financial scandal.
But the third source of what we think of as “the Warren Court” was
Republican President Dwight Eisenhower, who appears to have had no
special interest in entrenching a specific political agenda with his
appointments; he seemed more concerned with rewarding political favors
and pleasing particular constituencies. Thus, he appointed Earl Warren as a
reward for political favors during the 1952 presidential campaign.10
William J. Brennan was the beneficiary of a recess appointment on October
15, 1956, as a means of currying favor with northeastern Catholics in the
run-up to the 1956 election.11 Eisenhower is said to have regretted both
appointments.
By contrast, President Harry Truman, partisan Democrat though he
undoubtedly was, contributed nothing to the canonical “Warren Court.”
Truman viewed appointments to the Court as an opportunity to reward
friends and cronies—Fred Vinson, Sherman Minton, Harold Burton, and
Tom Clark—rather than an important vehicle of carrying out his “Fair
Deal” policies. These four appointees, however, all supported the judicial
deference to Congress that was integral to the New Deal revolution.12

7. Note that before 1937, Felix Frankfurter was a committed New Dealer and hardly a
conservative given the constitutional concerns of the day. By 1962, however, the same
general philosophy of judicial restraint had made him relatively conservative in the context
of the civil rights revolution that was about to burst forth.
8. See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 210-12 (2000).
9. Id. at 210.
10. See id. at 24.
11. See id. at 89. Powe quotes Dwight Eisenhower as asking his Attorney General,
Herbert Brownell, to find “a very good Catholic” who was also a “conservative Democrat.”
Id. Ironically, the only vote against his confirmation was provided by a fellow Catholic,
Wisconsin’s Senator Joseph McCarthy, who may have been far more prescient than
Eisenhower about Brennan’s likely politics. See id. at 90.
12. The most important disappointment President Harry Truman might have experienced
from his appointments was the vote of some of them in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But, as we argue below, it is far more likely
that general support for the Democratic Party and the New Deal was primarily on Truman’s
mind when he made these appointments earlier in his presidency.
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Thus, partisan entrenchment depends on the right mixture of motive and
opportunity. Even the brief history sketched above alerts us to the
contingent nature of each of these factors. Eisenhower and Truman, for
example, lacked the necessary motive to change constitutional law with
their appointments. But even if a President is quite determined to use
judicial appointments to change the direction of constitutional doctrine, he
may make very little headway if few Supreme Court vacancies occur during
his presidency. Jimmy Carter, for example, got no appointments at all,
while Richard Nixon was able to make four appointments in the first three
years of his presidency. Had Nixon been able to serve out his second term,
he would also have had the opportunity to replace William O. Douglas and,
therefore, to name a majority of the Court’s members.
In addition, replacing a Justice who already shares the same general
ideological outlook as the President will make comparatively little
difference to constitutional doctrine. Think, in this context, of Goldberg’s
replacement by Fortas. On the other hand, replacing a Justice who is
generally opposed to the President’s constitutional agenda is more likely to
have a significant effect. In recent times, the most dramatic example is
probably the replacement of Thurgood Marshall by Clarence Thomas,
which cemented a five person conservative majority on the Court. Perhaps
the most important question is whether the new appointment shifts the
identity of the median or “swing” Justice whose views control in the most
heavily contested cases. Thus, Roosevelt’s appointments between 1937 and
1942 moved the “swing” Justice from Owen Roberts to (someone like)
Hugo Black or Felix Frankfurter, and the replacement of Frankfurter with
Goldberg in 1962 moved the swing Justice from (someone like) Tom Clark
to William Brennan. (Clark himself, of course, would be replaced in 1966
by Thurgood Marshall, which further tipped the Court toward the left.)13
The recognition of these contingencies, and the “counter-histories” they
inspire, shows how much of constitutional change cannot be predicted in
advance and how little such change follows law-like regularities. If
Franklin D. Roosevelt been able to appoint several Supreme Court Justices
in his first term, the struggle over the New Deal might have been less of a
fight and more of a gradual transition, and the New Deal itself might have
looked different.14 Had Eisenhower appointed someone more competent
than Whittaker, similar to John Marshall Harlan or Potter Stewart, that
13. For a more detailed empirical account of this phenomenon, see Andrew D. Martin,
Kevin M. Quinn, & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court,
83 N.C. L. Rev 1275, 1300-04 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court voting patterns to
determine median Justices from 1937 to the present).
14. In this context, we note that among the various differences between our theory and
Bruce Ackerman’s is that Ackerman views strong opposition by the Court (or some other
key actor) as quite important to creating a new constitutional regime that amends the
Constitution outside of Article V. Ackerman’s explanation of why the New Deal
represented a “constitutional moment” depends on the Supreme Court’s resistance to
Roosevelt’s program. See generally Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations
(1998).
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Justice might well have served throughout the entire 1960s and 1970s,
resigning, like Stewart, only when another Republican President could
replace him.15 Or, if Arthur Goldberg had not succumbed to Lyndon
Johnson’s entreaties, he would have remained in office for many years
(Goldberg died in 1990), and there would have been no appointment of
Harry Blackmun (who replaced Fortas upon the latter’s resignation).
Indeed, had Johnson been able to restrain himself from trying to replace
Chief Justice Earl Warren with his close friend Abe Fortas, and then replace
Fortas with his Texas crony Homer Thornberry, there might have been no
“Burger Court” as such. Instead, the Court might have retained a liberal
majority through the early 1970s, when the Court decided a number of
important cases including Milliken v. Bradley16 and San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez17 by five to four margins, with all
four Nixon appointees voting as a bloc.18
It should be obvious, then, that our account of “partisan entrenchment”
does not assert that the course of constitutional development is predictable
and law-like. Quite the contrary, the whole point of the concept of partisan
entrenchment is to show how constitutional development is tied to the
vagaries of American politics, and, in particular, the politics of judicial
appointments. Because American politics, like all politics, is full of
contingencies, so too are important aspects of American constitutional
development.
Second, we also pointed out, as have others before us, that the Supreme
Court is part of national politics and tends to cooperate with the dominant
political forces of its time.19 The process of partisan entrenchment helps
ensure that the Supreme Court remains in sync with the political forces of
the day and thus plays its role as the judicial wing of the existing
constitutional regime. This is one of two key effects of partisan

15. Moreover, if Eisenhower had appointed more conservative Justices, they might have
resisted Johnson’s civil rights and Great Society measures and the Supreme Court would not
have acted as the judicial wing of the Democratic Party.
16. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
17. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
18. Or imagine if Lyndon B. Johnson, perhaps emulating Roosevelt’s wartime
appointment of the Republican Justice Harlan Fiske Stone as Chief Justice in 1941, had
nominated the moderate Potter Stewart or the Republican former Harvard Law School Dean
Erwin Griswold, who had been named by Johnson as Solicitor General of the United States
in 1967. Such a compromise might have given Johnson enough maneuvering room to
nominate another strongly liberal Democrat to fill Abe Fortas’s seat.
19. The canonical citation is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957) (“[T]he policy
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant
among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”). As Steven Calabresi notes, one
might also cite Mr. Dooley’s famous remark that “no matter whether th’ constitution follows
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.” Steven G. Calabresi, The
President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor Ackerman,
73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 478 n.42 (2006) (quoting Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s
Opinions 26 (1901)).
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entrenchment.20 The other is that judicial appointments from the past act as
a sort of “drag” or check on the ambitions of the current President and party
in power, at least until that party wins enough elections to entrench its own
supporters in the judiciary. These two effects correspond to the two reasons
why Presidents entrench: first, to secure future influence even when the
party loses power (as in the case of John Adams); and second, to secure a
bench likely to assist the President with his current political agenda (as in
the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, we believe, George W. Bush).
Thus, the Warren Court, like the Roosevelt Court, worked hand in hand
with the Democratic administrations of the time. Far from being
countermajoritarian institutions, the New Deal Court and the Warren Court
facilitated the goals of the then-existing national political coalition. The
New Deal Court did this primarily by reading federal power very broadly
and dismissing contrary claims of state regulatory authority. The Warren
Court brought regional majorities in the South (which were often
“majorities” only because, prior to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, AfricanAmerican voters were effectively disenfranchised) into line with the
nationally dominant liberal political majority. Hence, much of the work of
the Warren Court involved striking down state laws that hindered liberal
goals while upholding national civil rights and other liberal legislation.
Third, we offered several important caveats to the basic model of partisan
entrenchment. One has already been mentioned: Presidents differ in their
motivation to view judicial appointments as an important part of achieving
their policy agenda. Some Presidents (like Eisenhower and Truman) have
sought merely to reward cronies or to please certain regional or
demographic constituencies. Even Ronald Reagan, whose Administration
was particularly canny in its use of judicial appointments to further
Republican policy goals, named Sandra Day O’Connor to the Court in 1981
because Reagan had made a campaign promise to appoint the first woman
Justice and because the two southwesterners “clicked” when Reagan met
her shortly before deciding to nominate her. These factors resulted in a
somewhat more centrist and pragmatic replacement for Justice Potter
Stewart than Reagan might otherwise have appointed.
Equally important, and also contingent, is the balance of power in the
Senate, which may cause Presidents to moderate their appointment
strategies. Significant political obstacles often temper a President’s
opportunity to achieve his desires. This may hinder the President’s goals of
partisan entrenchment, especially when nominees must gain approval from
a Senate not controlled by the President’s own party. (The Senate’s actual
or expected resistance, and its effects on whom the President nominates, is
one way that the appointment process stays roughly in line with the vector
20. Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins
of Liberal Judicial Activism, in The Supreme Court and American Political Development
138-61 (Ronald Kahn & Ken Kersch eds., 2006); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts to Advance their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 18751891, 96 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 511 (2002).
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sum of political forces in the country.) Both Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan had nominees rejected by Democratic-controlled Senates and were
therefore forced to send relative moderates to the Senate. Had they dealt
with Senates controlled by conservative Republicans, they would have
easily succeeded in placing more conservative Justices on the bench.
Indeed, when Reagan faced a Republican controlled Senate in 1986, he was
able to appoint William Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship and Antonin
Scalia to the Court, whereas a year later, a now-Democratic Senate was able
to block Robert Bork’s ascension to the Court.
Finally, and crucially, Presidents tend to have a relatively limited field of
vision; they appoint judges and Justices because of the key policy and
constitutional questions that are salient at the time of confirmation. The
most important issues even a few years down the road may be quite
different from those that led to the choice of a particular appointee and the
President’s appointees may disagree among themselves markedly on those
issues. What the appointment process entrenches is a set of views reflecting
a particular political moment and a particular array of political forces.
Sometimes that political agenda and that balance of political forces will last
for quite a while, but in other instances, it may shift suddenly, as it did on
September 11, 2001.
For example, Richard Nixon’s four appointments between 1969 and 1971
were designed to limit the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions and
to rein in court-ordered busing and the constitutionalization of welfare
rights. This, the four new Nixon appointees largely achieved. Although
Harry Blackmun became more liberal during the 1980s, it is important to
remember that he provided the key fifth vote in such conservative decisions
as Milliken v. Bradley,21 San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,22 United States v. Kras,23 and National League of Cities v.
Usery.24 Blackmun was also, at least early in his career, a reliable vote on
behalf of the interests of law enforcement rather than the rights of criminal
defendants.
Nixon was not concerned with abortion when he made his Supreme
Court appointments. Three of his four appointees voted to recognize such a
right in Roe v. Wade,25 while the fourth, then-Justice William Rehnquist,
was joined by White (a Kennedy appointee) in dissent. Moreover, when
Nixon made his four appointments between 1969 and 1971, he almost
certainly did not imagine that his nominees might be called upon to decide
whether he had to disclose secret taped conversations about the Watergate
affair. Similarly, Roosevelt’s plethora of nominees—once the first-term
dam was breached—were appointed to cement federal regulatory power,
and this they did consistently and reliably. When the key questions moved
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to civil rights and civil liberties, they disagreed among themselves, a
disagreement reflected in the Roosevelt Administration itself. The longer a
Justice stays in office, the more distant becomes the political context that
gave rise to his or her nomination. This produces the familiar impression
(if not always the reality) that the Justices have “evolved” away from the
ideological interests that spawned their appointment. Nominees do not
normally disappoint the Presidents who appointed them on the issues that
are most salient at the time of appointment. Rather, such disappointment
generally occurs vis-à-vis newly salient issues that were not particularly
important to the President when searching for a nominee.
Fourth, we emphasize more than ever that partisan entrenchment is
primarily a theory about how change occurs in constitutional doctrine and
that such changes can and do occur throughout a variety of governmental
institutions. In our original article we concentrated—as do most legal
academics—on the work of courts in general and the Supreme Court in
particular. We argued that much constitutional change occurs not through
new Article V amendments but through the interpretations of constitutional
texts and precedents by Article III judges. But surely this does not exhaust
the forms of constitutional change. Even putting aside the most obvious
method of change—Article V amendment—both Congress and the
President engage in various modes of what Keith Whittington has called
“constitutional construction,”26 ranging from the creation of new
institutions to the adoption of super-statutes and regulatory schemes to the
shifting balance of power between the branches.27
Courts often play a role in these constitutional constructions. Courts may
legitimate new constitutional constructions or hold certain institutional
innovations unconstitutional; examples of the latter might include the Court
striking down the National Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States,28 congressional vetoes in INS v. Chadha,29 and the
Presidential line item veto in Clinton v. City of New York.30 Courts can
uphold or strike down super-statutes or read them broadly or narrowly, and
they can also intervene in the balance of power between the branches, as in
the famous decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.31
Nevertheless, much constitutional development (and therefore much
constitutional change) occurs outside of judicial case law. Steven Teles has
described how the conservative jurisprudence of the present era was
fostered by decades of institution building in conservative think tanks,
policy institutes, conservative public interest law firms, professional

26. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers
and Constitutional Meaning (1999).
27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, SuperStatutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215,
1216 (2001).
28. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
30. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
31. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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organizations like the Federalist Society, and constitutional scholarship.32
This institution building helped shape professional legal ideology,
generated new ideas and litigation strategies, drove litigation favoring
conservative causes through the court system, and created networks for job
placement and influence both in government and the private sector.
Conservative institution building helped create an agenda of cases that
conservative courts would later decide. It nourished a generation of
conservative lawyers and intellectuals, often placed in Supreme Court
clerkships and influential executive branch positions, who would produce
new conservative constitutional arguments and form a talent pool for
judicial appointments.
George W. Bush’s two Supreme Court
appointments, John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito, are among the results
of this long process of conservative institution building.33
In many areas, the constitutional law enunciated in formal opinions and
memoranda issued by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is sometimes at least as important as any
decision of Article III courts. The most obvious example over the past five
years is the OLC’s enunciation of the broad scope of presidential power in
foreign affairs, leading, in one notorious example, to a crabbed and narrow
reading of what constitutes “torture” banned by domestic law and
international treaties. The same “torture memo” also offered (to our minds,
at least) highly disturbing views about the essentially unconstrained powers
that the President enjoys under Article II.34 The OLC has also issued
memos absolving the President of obligations to obey existing treaties and

32. Steven M. Teles, The Evolution of the Conservative Legal Movement (unpublished
manuscript, 2006).
33. See Jo Becker & Dale Russakoff, Proving His Mettle in the Reagan Justice Dept.,
Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/08/AR2006010801165_pf.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito,
G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in ‘82, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2006, at A1, available at 2006
WLNR 1621211.
34. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in The Torture
Debate in America 317 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). The most egregious aspects of this
memorandum with regard to the definition of torture were repudiated in Memorandum from
Daniel Levin to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), in The Torture
Debate in America, supra, at 361. The equally controversial assertions about the President’s
Article II authority to override domestic and international law were withdrawn rather than
repudiated. Versions of the earlier argument, however, have reappeared in later Department
of Justice (DOJ) documents involving the propriety of the National Security Agency’s
(NSA) domestic surveillance program. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales,
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by
the President (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf. For a
reply to the DOJ analysis by fourteen distinguished constitutional lawyers, including
Kathleen Sullivan, Richard Epstein, former federal judge and FBI Director William
Sessions, and Walter Dellinger, see Marty Lederman, Scholars’ Reply to DOJ “White
Paper”
on
NSA,
FISA,
the
AUMF
and
Article
II,
Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/02/scholars-reply-to-doj-white-paper-on.html (Feb. 2, 2006,
17:08 EST).
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international law obligations, and, in a memo whose contents still remain
secret, gave its blessing to the President’s decision to employ the National
Security Administration (NSA) to spy on American citizens beyond the
confines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).
Presidents often change the practical balance of power between themselves
and the other branches through their assertions of constitutional authority.
In these executive assertions, the constitutional and legal interpretations of
the OLC and the DOJ may prove quite important in providing the necessary
professional and ideological cover for what the President seeks to do. The
OLC, and the DOJ more generally, have been crucial in creating and
providing constitutional interpretations justifying the President’s robust
assertions of Article II power to disregard congressional statutes that he
believes hamper his inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief,35 as well as
the President’s capacious view of the authority vested in him by the
September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force.
In the domestic arena, the OLC has also blazed new trails by legitimating
federal expenditures that directly aid religious schools.36 Similarly, a
thorough analysis of partisan entrenchment would include a study of the
Solicitor General’s office. Charles Fried, for example, clearly viewed one
of his roles as pressing the Reagan Administration’s agenda before the

35. See, e.g., President’s Statement on H.R. 199, USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 425 (Mar.
9, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-8.html
(declaring that the President may order DOJ officials to withhold information from Congress
about how the FBI is using the USA PATRIOT Act to search homes and secretly seize
papers notwithstanding statutory requirements if he decides it could impair national security
or executive branch operations); President’s Statement on H.R. 2863, Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 41 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1920 (Dec. 30, 2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. S50, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html (stating that “[t]he
executive branch shall construe” the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, prohibiting cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority
of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief”);
President’s Statement on H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006), reprinted in
2005
U.S.C.C.A.N.
S56,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060106-12.html (announcing that the
President will construe provisions which require disclosure of scientific information
uncensored “in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to withhold
information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national security, the
deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional
duties”).
36. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Michael D. Brown, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Sept. 25,
2002), available at 2002 WL 32100854; http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/FEMAAssistance.htm
(overruling, in part, Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Constitutionality of
Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious Properties, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
267 (1995)).
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Supreme Court (including, most famously, its views on Roe v. Wade37),
regardless of the Court’s likely response.38
Indeed, change in formal judicial constitutional doctrine often only
comes along after major attempts within other branches, particularly the
executive, to transform the status quo. Courts often arrive on the scene only
after major institutional changes—like the growth of the regulatory,
administrative, and welfare state—have already occurred, and then their
major task is to bless and legitimate these institutional changes, while
modifying and limiting them in comparatively minor respects. Even though
courts may resist these changes at first (in part because they were appointed
by political forces representing the preceding regime), in the long run they
perform their familiar institutional role of cooperating with the dominant
national coalition.
The growth of the administrative state in domestic politics, and the
national security state in foreign affairs, are the most salient examples of
long-term trends that can only be described as “constitutional.” The courts
did not play a central role in constructing them, but rather deferred to
decisions occurring elsewhere in the constitutional system, eventually
crafting doctrines that rationalized and accommodated these institutional
innovations. For example, the constitutional struggle over the New Deal in
the mid-1930s offered only a temporary setback to the growth of the
administrative and regulatory state; elements of that state had already
appeared in the early twentieth century and especially during World War I.
Following Roosevelt’s appointments to the Supreme Court, the federal
courts largely acquiesced in the development of the administrative and
regulatory state, creating constitutional doctrines that rationalized its
existence. The reason for that acquiescence is connected to the theory of
partisan entrenchment: The Democratic Party—which championed the
growth of the administrative state—kept winning elections and appointing
like-minded judges. Eventually, the Republican Party capitulated to the
changes in governmental structure; instead of simply opposing the
administrative state in all of its forms, it sought an administrative state that
furthered its policy agendas. The next two Republican Presidents,
Eisenhower and Nixon, accepted the administrative state as fully normal
and did not attempt to roll back the New Deal. Indeed, Nixon helped
solidify and expand the welfare state that built on the New Deal. In short,
new constitutional developments often do not begin with the courts—rather,
Congress and the presidency build new constitutional institutions, and the
courts eventually rationalize them. As we explain in the second half of this
essay, that is precisely what we think the courts will do with respect to the
institutions and practices that characterize the emergent National
Surveillance State.

37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See generally Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing The Reagan Revolution—A
Firsthand Account (1991).
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With these important caveats in mind, we continue to believe that the
concept of “partisan entrenchment” helps us understand both why changes
in constitutional doctrine occur and how and why the Supreme Court tends,
in the long run, to cooperate with the vector sum of forces in national
politics. Swing or median Justices often tend to see their role as fostering
decisions that do not stray too far from the center of national public
opinion. Moreover, the median Justice in a multimember Court, simply
because he or she is the median, tends to push the Court’s work back to the
center. If the Court as a whole strays too often and too widely from the
desires of the dominant forces in national politics (or if the median Justice
turns out to be fairly far from the political median), the appointment process
soon pushes the Court back into line. The calibration is hardly perfect, and
there is almost always at least some tension between the Court and the
national political branches, but it may not be much greater than that which
exists within any functioning political coalition over time.39
In 2001, we noted that the replacement of Justice Marshall with Justice
Thomas in 1991 had formed a new five-person conservative majority on a
number of issues, including federalism and religion. We argued that we
were on the cusp of what might be an even more significant constitutional
revolution in a number of areas, depending on subsequent appointments to
the Supreme Court. Finally, we argued that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bush v. Gore,40 in which the five conservative Justices handed the
presidency to George W. Bush, threw a monkey wrench into the entire
analysis. The Justices had used their power of judicial review to entrench a
President who, in turn, would appoint lower court judges and Supreme
Court Justices who would continue the conservative constitutional
revolution that they had begun. This judicial bootstrapping or selfentrenchment, we argued, was both unfair and illegitimate. It is one thing
for a party returned to power by the voters to entrench its constitutional
vision in a series of appointments; it is quite another for that party’s allies in
the judiciary to put that party in power so as to replenish itself.
Nevertheless, we argued that Bush v. Gore was a singular phenomenon, not
likely to be repeated (and therefore unlikely to be reversed). As a result, we
argued that the future and the scope of the conservative constitutional

39. One factor that may disturb these conclusions is the ever-increasing length that
Justices serve on the Supreme Court. “Life tenure” may now have a considerably different
meaning than it once did, when Justices tended to retire at an earlier age and appointments
were more frequent. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the
Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, in Reforming the Court: Term Limits for
Supreme Court Justices 15 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006). Robert
Dahl’s famous argument that the Court’s policy views would stay in rough correspondence
to those of the national political coalition was predicated in part on the fact that new
appointments to the Court were made roughly every two and a half years or so. However,
between Stephen Breyer’s arrival in 1994 and Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s death in
2005, the Court had no vacancies, the longest period of stability since the early nineteenth
century.
40. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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revolution would be determined through ordinary politics. Five years later,
we can look back on what we correctly diagnosed and what we missed.
II. THE ELECTION OF 2000 AND THE ELECTION OF 2004
The first, and most obvious, issue concerns the consequences of Bush v.
Gore. Writing in the middle of 2001, we were concerned that the
conservative Supreme Court majority had bootstrapped itself—securing a
new set of conservative Supreme Court appointments without fairly
winning a presidential election. However, no Justices retired until 2005. In
the interim, however, the Republicans not only increased their
representation in the Senate in 2002, but also won the presidency and
further increased their Senate representation in 2004. This illustrates the
important role that the Senate plays in the mechanics of partisan
entrenchment. Ironically, liberals would probably have been far better off
had Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
retired in 2001 or 2002, when Democrats controlled the Senate, albeit by
one vote, than in 2005, when a far more Republican Senate was able to
steamroll the nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito.
This does not mean that Bush v. Gore had no impact on the fortunes of
conservative constitutionalism. For one thing, placing a Republican in the
White House gave the Republicans the advantages of incumbency, which,
all other things being equal, significantly increased the chances of a
Republican winning the White House in 2004. Moreover, Bush was able to
appoint various people to policy-making posts in his Administration,
including important appointments to the DOJ, OLC, and other legal
positions throughout the Administration. Bush appointees, including David
Addington, William Haynes, Jay Bybee, and John Yoo, developed policies
that justified Bush’s assertions of presidential power, articulating a theory
which, in its most aggressive forms, approximates what Clinton Rossiter so
memorably—and troublingly—labeled “constitutional dictatorship.”41
Political appointees at the Department of Justice helped bless Tom DeLay’s
gerrymandering of the Texas districts for the House of Representatives,
helping the Republicans maintain control of the House, while rejecting
challenges to the racially discriminatory effects of Georgia’s requirement
that all voters possess specific means of personal identification.42
Moreover, even if George W. Bush had no opportunity to name any
Justices in his first term, he was able to nominate 168 district judges and
sixty-five appellate judges, of whom eighty-seven percent and fifty-two
41. See Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the
Modern Democracies 3-14 (1948).
42. See Dan Eggen, Criticism of Voting Law Was Overruled: Justice Dept. Backed
Georgia Measure Despite Fears of Discrimination, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 2005, at A01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/
AR2005111602504.html; Dan Eggen, Justice Plays Down Memo Critical of Ga. Voter ID
Plan, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2005, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111701496.html.
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percent, respectively, were confirmed.43 At least some of these nominees
had been blocked by Democrats when they controlled the Senate between
2001 and 2003 but then were successfully confirmed upon the loss of the
Senate to Republicans in the 2002 elections. As we pointed out in our
previous essay, the lower courts are quite important to the processes of
constitutional change. First, the lower federal courts decide virtually all
federal cases; fewer than .05% are reviewed by the Supreme Court.44 As a
practical matter, the willing support of lower federal court judges is
necessary for a constitutional revolution to succeed. The Supreme Court
simply does not have the time and energy to engage in close monitoring of
the “inferior” courts, especially when applying its doctrines requires
potentially controversial factual characterizations, or, indeed, any measure
of balancing of competing interests. Lower court judges who share what
we have termed the “high politics”45 of the Supreme Court—fundamental
visions as to what constitutes the most desirable political or constitutional
order—will be delighted to carry out and further its doctrinal innovations in
a wide variety of circumstances; conversely, those nominal “inferior” court
judges who reject that politics can find numerous ways to evade, narrow, or
distinguish precedents using the various techniques of doctrinal analysis.
Constitutional revolutions require the Supreme Court’s willingness to make
significant doctrinal changes in particular areas. But they also require
support by lower courts (as well as low-level and relatively invisible
bureaucrats) who will faithfully implement these doctrinal shifts over time.
Second, lower federal courts help set the agenda for issues that the
Supreme Court will later address, as well as entertain new arguments and
test the limits of existing doctrines. For example, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have proved particularly
important testing grounds for cases involving the scope of executive
power.46 If, as we shall argue in a moment, increased executive power is
43. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the
Federal Courts, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 871, 904-05 (2005).
44. See David S. Law & Sanford Levinson, Why Nuclear Disarmament May Be Easier
to Achieve than an End to Partisan Conflict Over Judicial Appointments, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev.
923, 927 (2005).
45. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1062.
46. Although, as it turned out in the Jose Padilla litigation, the administration may have
taken the lower federal courts too much for granted. See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583
(4th Cir. 2005) (refusing to allow the transfer of Padilla to civilian law enforcement custody
after holding him for three years as an enemy combatant because of “an appearance that the
government may be attempting to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme
Court”). The author of the opinion, Judge J. Michael Luttig, who had been a stalwart
defender of the administration’s claims of power to conduct the War on Terror and a
potential Supreme Court pick, stated that the government’s “actions have left . . . the
impression that Padilla may have been held for these years, even if justifiably, by mistake”
and that “the principle in reliance upon which it has detained Padilla for this time,” the
President’s “authority to detain enemy combatants who enter into this country for the
purpose of attacking America . . . can, in the end, yield to expediency with little or no cost to
its conduct of the war against terror.” Id. at 587. Some six months later, after President Bush
nominated John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the Supreme Court, Judge Luttig
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one of the key elements of the emerging constitutional revolution, having
ideological allies of the President on these courts is quite important to the
success of that revolution. One explanation for the increasing acrimony
over judicial nominations to the lower federal courts is that members of
both parties recognize the importance of capturing or maintaining control of
those courts. Moreover, during the past quarter century, Presidents from
both parties have increasingly chosen Supreme Court Justices from the
federal appellate courts. Democrats probably opposed some of Bush’s
lower court appointments in his first term (Miguel Estrada is one obvious
example) because they did not want to give a “free pass” to wellcredentialed nominees who would clearly be on “short lists” for the
Supreme Court itself. It would be more difficult to explain why someone
confirmed overwhelmingly to be on a circuit court is later thought unfit for
promotion to the Supreme Court.
In any event, the fight over lower court nominees and the struggle over
Senate filibusters that it spawned are hard to understand without
recognizing the partisan bitterness that followed the contested election of
2000 and George W. Bush’s rapid turn to the hard right upon taking the
oath of office. Even so, Senate Democrats were rarely, if ever, willing to
advert to Bush v. Gore. Although one of us (Levinson) testified before a
Senate subcommittee on September 4, 2001 about judicial nominations, he
was cautioned, prior to his oral testimony, not to bring up Bush v. Gore,
which he had referred to in his written testimony as “a stinking pig in the
parlor.”47 Still, Democrats were able to stave off some of the most
ideological appointments between June 2001 and January 2003 because
they controlled the Senate during that period. The Republicans’ recapture
of the Senate in the 2002 elections changed the balance of power;
thereafter, Democrats offered only limited resistance. Bush treated his
victory in 2004—whether one calls it an “election” or a “reelection”
depends on one’s view of Bush v. Gore—as a mandate to renominate some
of the most controversial lower court candidates, such as Janice Rogers
Brown and Priscilla Owen, as well as to make a few fairly aggressive recess
appointments. He also nominated two strongly conservative judges, John
G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito, to the Supreme Court. In every way, then,
the election of 2004 reinforced the Republican Party’s existing strategy of
partisan entrenchment. Democrats were simply routed in their attempt to
block that entrenchment.

resigned his federal judgeship to take a job as a senior vice-president and general counsel at
the Boeing Corporation. See Jerry Markon, Appeals Court Judge Leaves Life Appointment
for Boeing, Wash. Post, May 11, 2006, at A11, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/10/AR2006051000929_pf.html.
47. See The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the S.
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 166 (2001) (statement of Sanford Levinson, Professor of Law, University of Texas
School of Law).

BALKIN AND LEVINSON

2006]

THE PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

10/20/2006

117

The President’s second term appointments of John Roberts, Harriet Miers
(which was later withdrawn), and Samuel Alito fit our model of partisan
entrenchment fairly well. They are appointments designed to further the
President’s key constitutional goals—in this case, the maximization of
presidential power. Miers, who had been the President’s counsel and
helped develop many of the President’s policies, was particularly likely to
read executive power broadly. Roberts and Alito also fit fairly well into the
President’s constitutional agenda. To be sure, significant elements of the
Republican faithful opposed the Miers nomination and ultimately sank it.
But that is because they saw it as an example of cronyism rather than as a
true partisan entrenchment. They did not trust Bush when he said that
Miers would further the goals of the Republican revolution. Moreover, they
wanted candidates with strong qualifications and clear conservative views
so that they could aggressively take the fight over judicial philosophy to
liberal Democrats in the Senate.
However much a crony of the President Miers was, her nomination did
not involve any abandonment of the presidential strategy of partisan
entrenchment. President Bush may have felt (incorrectly, as it turned out)
that the “stealth nomination” of a relatively unknown woman would lead to
an easier confirmation. The problem, however, was that stealth nominees
are most likely to succeed when their qualifications are judged impeccable.
As Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal have pointed out, Senators are least likely
to vote against a Supreme Court nominee when the nominee’s
qualifications are generally considered outstanding.48 When a nominee’s
qualifications are judged as suspect or wanting, however, Senators are less
likely to vote for the candidate the more the nominee’s perceived ideology
differs from their own.49 Hence, stealth nominees perceived to have weak
qualifications lose support not merely from members of the opposition
party, but also from the President’s own party because devoted partisans
cannot be sure that the nominee’s views are congruent with their own.
Lack of firm public commitments about prominent legal issues of the day
may make a stealth candidate more, rather than less, attractive to members
of the opposition. Indeed, many Democrats might ultimately have
supported Miers: Her positions on abortion, homosexuality, and affirmative
action were quite uncertain, and she had even made campaign contributions
to Al Gore in 1988. Instead, members of President Bush’s own
conservative base sank the Miers nomination because they did not trust him
sufficiently to pick someone whose views were as conservative as theirs.
Many conservatives had felt betrayed by an earlier stealth nominee, David
Souter, nominated by President Bush’s father. (At the time of his
48. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial
Appointments 103 (2006).
49. Jack M. Balkin, Is the Miers Nomination in Trouble? Some Data from Epstein and
Segal’s Advice and Consent, Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/is-miersnomination-in-trouble-some.html (Oct. 6, 2005, 07:31 EST) (citing Lee & Epstein, supra
note 48).
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nomination, Souter’s credentials were widely judged to be very good, and
so, in accordance with Epstein and Segal’s model, he faced relatively little
opposition.) Souter, whose views were almost completely unknown in
1990, has turned out to be far closer to the Justice he replaced, William J.
Brennan, than anyone imagined at the time; thus, many conservatives were
unwilling to take a similar chance with Miers. Democratic support only
added to their suspicions.
Hardcore members of the President’s
conservative base wanted a nominee who stood forthrightly for
conservative constitutional principles and who would champion these views
in a confirmation battle. Many, no doubt, were looking for a nominee who
might provoke the Democrats to filibuster, which in turn would allow
Republicans to engage in the so-called “nuclear option” that would
eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominations.
III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S SYMBOLIC AGENDA
More interestingly, the Miers example counsels us to be careful in
describing Bush’s appointment agenda. The constitutional agenda that a
President seeks to entrench is an amalgam of the different interests in his
coalition along with his own. The contemporary Republican Party, like
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Democratic Party, is an alliance of disparate groups
with competing agendas. Much of the public discussion of the three
nominees focused on the likelihood that they would vote to overturn Roe v.
Wade or cut back on legal protection for gay and lesbian rights. However,
as we have explained elsewhere, it is altogether unclear that the collective
political interests of the Republican Party are furthered by overruling Roe or
even Lawrence v. Texas, as opposed to hollowing out the right to
reproductive choice and strictly limiting any further extensions of
Lawrence.
Social and religious conservatives may care deeply about abortion and
genuinely wish its criminalization. But this remains a minority position in
the United States.50 Overruling Roe might alienate those elements of the
Republican coalition who view themselves as moderates, business
conservatives, or suburban “country-club” conservatives who want low
taxes and little government regulation of their businesses but otherwise
support abortion rights for themselves, their wives, or their children.
Moderate Republican women, in particular, have been able to stay with the
50. In a CNN opinion poll conducted from August 30 to September 2, 2006, forty-five
percent of those polled said they would favor “a law in your state that would ban all
abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother.” PollingReport.com,
Abortion and Birth Control, http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (last visited Sept.
17, 2006). A Pew Research poll taken from July 6 to 19, 2006 found that forty-six percent
of those polled wanted abortion legal only in cases of rape, incest, or threat to life, or not at
all. Id. However, a Los Angeles Times poll taken from April 8 to 11, 2006 found that only
thirty-five percent of those polled approved of South Dakota’s new law banning abortion
except to save a woman’s life, and an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll taken from
December 9 to 12, 2005 found that sixty percent of the public opposed overturning Roe v.
Wade. Id.
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party for many years secure in the knowledge that the federal courts would
stymie any attempts by social and religious conservatives in the Republican
Party to implement the full level of their hostility to Roe. There is also a
vocal constituency within the Party (exemplified by the Cato Institute) that
defines itself as libertarian and thus is hardly sympathetic to attempts by the
state to regulate fundamental aspects of individual private choice.
Assuming that the President and his political strategists hope to keep the
Republicans in power for the indefinite future, it would hardly be surprising
that the President did not regard overturning Roe as a high priority in his
Supreme Court nominees; quite the contrary, there is now probably a
“reverse litmus test” for Supreme Court Justices: uphold the formal right to
abortion, but whittle away at it slowly.51
If Roe is not the crucial issue, what does explain Bush’s choice of
candidates like Roberts, Miers, and Alito? Many (including ourselves in
2001) had expected that a key agenda item for Republicans would be
federalism, the return to a view of states as more autonomous and protected
against intrusions from the federal government. A major theme of our
earlier article was the Rehnquist Court’s increasing success in changing the
contours of the constitutional doctrines regarding state’s rights. We
hypothesized that, with a few more conservative appointments, important
elements of the “New Deal Settlement”—which delegated broad powers to
the federal government to regulate in the public interest—might be under
attack. There seemed to be good reason for such fears. As an excellent
recent article by Cornell Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill demonstrates, the
national Republican Party, particularly after 1980, attempted to make
federalism a “cleavage issue” between the two major parties.52 Republican
Party platforms from the Reagan years onwards enunciated what Clayton
and Pickerill call “fixed federalism,”53 demanding firm judicially
enforceable limits on federal power, in contrast to the Democrat’s emphasis
on “flexibl[e]” federalism.54 The 1980 Republican platform pledged to
appoint judges “whose judicial philosophy is characterized by the highest
regard for . . . the decentralization of the federal government and efforts to
return decisionmaking power to state and local elected officials.”55 By
1984, when Ronald Reagan was running for reelection, the party’s platform
stated that “[o]ur Constitution . . . provides for a federal system. . . . In that
system, judicial power must be exercised with deference towards State and
local officials.”56 Promoting state and local prerogatives was a major
51. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reverse Litmus Test, Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/07/reverse-litmus-test.html (July 10, 2005, 01:07 EST).
52. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Guess What Happened on the Way to
Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court’s Federalism Revolution, 34 Publius: J. of
Federalism 85, 100 (2004).
53. Id. at 105.
54. Id. at 103.
55. Id. at 102.
56. The Am. Presidency Project, Republican Party Platform of 1984 (Aug. 20, 1984),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1984.
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theme of an important document prepared within the Justice Department in
1988; it announced goals that the DOJ hoped could be achieved by 2000
through a concerted litigation strategy that sought to present innovative
states’ rights arguments to favorably disposed judges, most appointed by
the Republicans themselves.57
And, of course, by 2001, such cases as New York v. United States,58
Printz v. United States,59 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,60 Alden v.
Maine,61 City of Boerne v. Flores,62 United States v. Lopez,63 United States
v. Morrison,64 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,65 and Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett66 had provided ample reason to
believe that the federalism revolution was underway and would only
proceed further if George W. Bush, courtesy of the Supreme Court, was
able to make new appointments to the Court. We were certainly not alone
in expressing such views. In 1997, Federalist Society founding father and
Northwestern law professor Steven Calabresi wrote an enthusiastic article
in the Wall Street Journal heralding “A Constitutional Revolution”67
following such decisions as Lopez, Printz, and Boerne. One can only
assume conservatives like Calabresi were optimistic about George W.
Bush’s ascension to the presidency in 2000, believing that the Court was
about to go much further in reining in—or at least significantly cutting back
on—the New Deal settlement. This did not happen, however, and one
cannot explain the failure to achieve either Calabresi’s hopes or our fears
simply by the fact that Bush had no opportunity to alter the Court’s
composition during his first term. We do not wish to say that no further
changes in federalism doctrine are in the offing: We may see, either
through statutory construction or through new constitutional doctrine, new
limits on environmental protection.68 Nevertheless, after cases like Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,69 Tennessee v. Lane,70 and
57. See generally Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney
General, The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation
(1988). See also Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 Ind. L.J. 363,
398 (2003). Judicial appointments were part of the same concerted strategy; Republicans
hoped to establish partners in the judiciary who would be receptive to their arguments.
58. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
59. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
60. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
61. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
62. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
63. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
64. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
65. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
66. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
67. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., A Constitutional Revolution, Wall St. J., July 10, 1997,
at A14.
68. See Rapanos v. U.S. Army Core of Eng’rs, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (interpreting the Clean Water Act not to reach certain wetlands which have only a
minimal hydrological connection to navigable waters).
69. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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Gonzales v. Raich,71 it seems fairly clear, at least as of 2006, that the
“federalism revolution” has been substantially slowed, if not stopped in its
tracks. There will be no return to what Douglas Ginsburg once called “the
Constitution in Exile”—a pre-New Deal Constitution with sharply limited
federal powers.72
The reason why things did not turn out as we feared flows from one of
our own basic assumptions, even if, alas, we did not pay sufficient attention
to it. The dominant national political coalition, now controlled by
Republicans, simply did not want a serious rollback of the scope of federal
power created in the wake of the New Deal. As Clayton and Pickerill
suggest, Republicans, since their capture of Congress in 1994 and, even
more so, since their recapture of the presidency in 2001, have “advocate[d]
federal control over more policy areas,” even as Democrats now
“advocat[e] even greater devolution of policymaking power.”73 This is an
example of what one of us (Balkin) calls “ideological drift”—the changing
political valence of political and legal arguments as they are repeated in
ever new political and social contexts.74 In fact, political parties’
commitment to federalism throughout American history has often been
opportunistic, premised on the current constellation of political forces.
National politicians of both parties are most likely to support federalism (1)
when it allows them to punt controversial issues back to state and local
governments, thus avoiding responsibility; and (2) when they lack
substantial control over the national political process. Conversely, they
prefer national solutions when they have sufficient clout to impose them.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that Republicans, upon controlling both
Congress and the presidency for the first time in almost seventy-five years,
would find national power increasingly attractive. Republicans sought to
use the national government to favor their own projects and to promote
their own regulatory agendas like tort reform, selective tax cuts, and partial
privatization of Social Security.
Republican hegemony has not produced smaller government, but rather
“big government conservatism,” which included the No Child Left Behind
Act,75 a Medicare drug benefit,76 as well as hefty doses of pork for the
favored constituents of the Republican Party, administrative regulations
70. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
71. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
72. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, Regulation, Winter 1995, at 83
(reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People
through
Delegation
(1993)),
available
at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18n1f.html.
73. Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 52, at 114 n.83 (citing Paul Peterson, The Changing
Politics of Federalism, in Evolving Federalism: The Intergovernmental Balance of Power in
America and Europe 25 (2003)).
74. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 869
(1993).
75. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6600 (2002).
76. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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benefiting specific industries, and tax cuts, tax cuts, and more tax cuts. The
national political coalition dominated by Republicans did not seek a
weakened federal government with judicially enforced limits, but rather one
that could use all of the constitutional powers of the post-New Deal era
selectively to benefit its own favored groups and interests. One need only
think of proposals for nationwide bans on human cloning and stem-cell
research, the federal statute criminalizing partial-birth abortions, or the
unsuccessful attempt by the Bush Administration to invalidate Oregon’s
Dignity-in-Death Act through an unusually expansive interpretation of a
federal statute.77
A recent New York Times story, aptly titled “‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is
Overriding States’ Powers,” is especially illuminating.78 Stephen Labaton
writes that “[a]cross Washington, federal agencies that supervise everything
from auto safety to medicine labeling have waged a powerful counterattack
against active state prosecutors and trial lawyers.”79 Labaton notes that
“[i]n the last three decades, the state courts and legislatures have been vital
avenues for critics of Washington deregulation. Federal policy makers,
having caught onto the game, are now striking back.”80
The important point to recognize about federal deregulation is that, like
federal regulation, it generally requires a national rule that can only be
justified by expansive claims of federal authority to regulate commerce or
to tax or spend for the general welfare. Similarly, the Social Security
reforms and private investment accounts championed by the Bush
Administration require the robust constitutional powers that came with the
New Deal. Then-Senator Robert Dole, perhaps having read the Republican
Party platforms, might have begun each day’s Senate sessions during the
early 1990s with a reading of the Tenth Amendment. However, the
Republican commitment to federalism in practice has been largely
symbolic, if not completely bogus; or, to be somewhat more nuanced, it
may easily be overridden in order to serve political interests in pleasing
wealthy contributors and business allies who chafe at the exercise of state
autonomy.
We have no doubt that a majority of the current Court is capable of
rendering federalism decisions that will please parts of the conservative
base. But we would be surprised if any of their decisions would
fundamentally cut back on national power in truly important policy areas.
The lesson we draw from the past five years is that the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism revolution was part of the Republicans’ “symbolic agenda”—
that is, constitutional claims that pleased its conservative base—but that
77. This was, of course, struck down by a majority of the Court in Gonzales v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 904, 925-26 (2006).
78. Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 10, 2006, at C5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/
politics/10legal.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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there was not, in fact, a serious and principled commitment to using
constitutional doctrine to restore genuine state autonomy, much less the
degree of autonomy that existed before the New Deal. Thus, we might
distinguish between the “symbolic agenda” of the Republican Party—the
symbolic rhetoric about what the Constitution means—from the “material
agenda”—that is, the actual reforms that the presidential and congressional
wings of the Party seek to achieve through judicial appointments and
legislation.
Levinson’s colleagues Ernest Young and Lynn Baker have pointed out
that any serious attack on national power would require drastic changes in
preemption and conditional federal spending doctrines.81 Moreover, both
have suggested that political liberals might come to appreciate some of the
merits of decentralized government as conservatives attempt to use national
power in decidedly illiberal ways. Though their argument is not without
merit, we generally do not share their overall pro-federalism politics, and
we were fearful in 2001 that the Supreme Court’s installation of George W.
Bush might portend the adoption of some of Young’s and Baker’s views by
the federal courts. We were wrong. The Court has not become more “antipreemption” in its reading of federal statutes, nor has it indicated any
willingness to cut back on the legitimacy of placing conditions on federal
spending. As suggested earlier, had we paid more attention to the
theoretical presuppositions of our own model, we should have assumed that
the Republicans, once in power, would work to maintain their power, using
whatever resources of the national government were available to them.
And, of course, there is no reason to believe that a Republican-appointed
Court would fail to cooperate with the Washington-based Republican
majority. Many of the Rehnquist Court’s limitations on federal power
involved legislation like the Violence Again Women Act passed by
Democratic Congresses prior to 1994 and about which the Republican
controlled Congress cared little.82 Now that the Republicans have
controlled Congress for a decade, they are unlikely to wish that a
conservative Supreme Court will knock down their legislative
achievements, whether it be the No Child Left Behind Act, the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, or the Solomon
Amendment.83
The Supreme Court’s commitment to federalism and to limited federal
government combines robust sloganeering with relatively minor practical
effects. The most important result of the federalism decisions seems to
81. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard
of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 154-55 (2001); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1911 (1995); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 66-79.
82. Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, 63
(2004); Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 Ind. L.J. 123, 125
(“[I]t was not until the Court had allies elsewhere in the federal government that it began
systematically to strike statutes enacted by past Congresses.”).
83. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (West Supp. 2006).
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have been limiting the use of federal civil rights laws for damage awards
against state governments under the Eleventh Amendment. Certainly this
protects states to some degree, but it does very little to stem the growth of
the federal government. Nor, in fact, has it helped secure the fiscal security
of state governments, for the largest fiscal burdens on states do not come
from damage awards in federal civil rights suits.84 So if federalism is not
the linchpin of the Bush Administration’s constitutional agenda—and
therefore does not explain the President’s choice of candidates like John
Roberts and Samuel Alito—what else might it be?
Perhaps, as we suggested in 2001, it is a desire to eviscerate racial and
ethnic preferences, and to eliminate “affirmative action” in all of its forms
and venues.85 But this, too, did not occur during the Rehnquist Court years.
To be sure, Justice Anthony Kennedy is now the Court’s swing vote, and he
dissented in Grutter v. Bollinger,86 which upheld the University of
Michigan Law School’s affirmative-action plan. We may venture to guess
that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are no great champions of
affirmative action. Even so, we caution against the easy assumption that
Grutter will be overturned in the near future, although it is certainly
possible that the Court will narrow it in future cases. The reason, once
again, concerns the makeup of the Republican coalition. Important
elements of the establishment, ranging from big business to the military, are
not at all opposed to affirmative action; indeed, for various reasons, they
have even embraced it. Sixty-five major corporations collaborated in an
amicus brief in Grutter strongly defending the need for affirmative action to
ensure competition in an increasingly globalized marketplace.87 Moreover,
a number of high-level former officers and Defense Department officials
submitted an amicus brief emphasizing affirmative action’s role in
producing an effective military consisting of multiple races and ethnicities
who had to live and work together.88 Both of these briefs were cited
prominently in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter.89 It is quite possible

84. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2605-14
(2005) (arguing that the interaction of federal regulations with the business cycle, and not the
Court’s federalism doctrines, are the greatest determinant of fiscal burdens on states). “The
Court,” Super explains, “has expanded states’ immunity from suits, largely in areas where
the state actions raise civil rights concerns, but little evidence suggests that liability for such
conduct was a major burden on states’ fiscs.” Id. at 2604.
85. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1061.
86. 539 U.S. 306, 387-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (arguing that “the skills and training need[ed]
to succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and
viewpoints”); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
3-4, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
88. See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (arguing that “a highly
qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principal mission to provide national security”).
89. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
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that Solicitor General Theodore Olson, who represented the United States in
opposition to Michigan’s affirmative action program, lost his case in
Grutter at the beginning of his argument, when he could not offer a
convincing response to the military’s claims that the United States’ military
academies needed race-conscious affirmative action in admissions because
national security demanded a “highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps.”90
One may well doubt that the University of Michigan Law School would
have prevailed in the absence of support from such establishment entities as
the military and Fortune 500 companies. There is no reason to believe that
the support of these organizations will evaporate in the foreseeable future.
By now Justice Kennedy may be too publicly committed to striking down
affirmative action to affect a graceful retreat. However, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito have not yet spoken on the subject. Even if they
would have joined the dissenters in Grutter as an initial matter, overturning
the case would require renouncing stare decisis in a very recent decision on
a highly charged matter and would risk provoking political turmoil within
the GOP’s own increasingly restive coalition. A more likely scenario, as
with Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
would be a series of decisions that chip away at the edges of Grutter. When
we say that affirmative action is part of the Bush Administration’s
“symbolic agenda,” we do not mean to suggest that Republican opposition
to affirmative action is not strongly felt or sincere. We mean only that, for
various political reasons, making most affirmative action unconstitutional
has not been a key goal of the Bush Administration’s Supreme Court
appointments. And, of course, if a Democrat prevails in 2008 and makes
two new Supreme Court appointments (a replacement for John Paul Stevens
merely preserves the status quo), then affirmative action should be safe for
some years against judicial invalidation.
In the area of gay rights, we can tell a similar story. Movement
conservatives suffered a stinging defeat in Lawrence v. Texas, where both
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor voted to strike down Texas’s ban on sameBecause Kennedy remains the swing Justice, the
sex sodomy.91
Republicans need an additional appointment if they hope to overturn
Lawrence. The President used the Musgrave Amendment92 (which would
ban gay marriage on both the state and federal levels) to rally his
conservative base in the 2004 election. But the long term trend is toward
greater tolerance for homosexuals in public life.93 Whatever constitutional
90. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-28, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-241.pdf
(discussing the military brief); Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., supra note 90, at 5.
91. 539 U.S. 558, 562-80, 580-85 (2003).
92. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
93. For a summary of recent shifts in public opinion, see the discussion in Michael J.
Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev. 431, 443-45 (2005); see
also Gallup Brain, Gallup Poll Social Series: Values and Beliefs, May 5-7, 2003,
http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0305030
(noting
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revolution the Bush Administration might desire, it is unlikely to include
returning to the days when gays and lesbians had no rights that
heterosexuals were bound to respect. Led by the Vice-President, most
Republicans have manifested love and esteem for their gay and lesbian
children, significant others, relatives, and workplace associates. Gay rights
will make progress no matter what the Court does, given that every poll
demonstrates increasing tolerance for nonheterosexuals by the relatively
young who are destined to play an ever greater role in our future polity. It
is possible, perhaps even likely, that the Supreme Court will offer no further
positive assistance than it provided in Lawrence. But if Michael Klarman’s
theory of backlash politics is correct as applied to the politics of sexual
orientation, the Court may well do far more for the cause of gay rights if it
simply stays out of the area in the next decade than if it comes directly to
the aid of the movement.94
IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MATERIAL AGENDA
This brings us, at long last, to what we believe is the deeper agenda of the
Bush Administration and, therefore, the constitutional politics that its
appointments are trying to entrench. One key element of that agenda
concerns religion.
Unlike federalism, we believe that the Bush
Administration’s commitment to changing the constitutional boundaries
between church and state is especially important. Moreover, previous
Republican appointments have already borne considerable fruit. The
changes in constitutional doctrines involving religion have come closer than
any others in the last fifteen years to deserving the name “revolutionary.”
There has been a distinct and genuine move from the Warren and early
Burger Court’s general hostility to government support of religion to a new
theory of “neutrality” symbolized by the 2002 decision in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.95 The Court now places relatively few barriers in the way
of state or federal funds going to religious schools or other religious
organizations so long as the purpose is not a naked preference for religious
versus secular organizations. Some advocates believed—some with horror,
some with joy—that this portended a full 180 degree turn, in which the
Supreme Court would define “neutrality” as requiring support for religious
education so long as nonreligious education received support. Thus many
conservative religionists—most of them Christian, but some of them
Orthodox Jews—no doubt hoped that the Court would strike down the State
of Washington’s refusal to let Joshua Davey major in devotional theology,
overwhelming movement toward decriminalization of sodomy from 1986 when Bowers v.
Hardwick was decided, and 2003, when the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas); see
also Paul R. Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J.
Pol. 1208, 1208-09 (2003) (noting a substantial reduction during the 1990s in the percentage
of Americans who regard same-sex relations as wrong). Support for gay rights increases in
younger populations. See Klarman, supra, at 445, 484-89.
94. See Klarman, supra note 93, at 472-82.
95. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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though he could major in practically anything else, if he wished to take
advantage of a $1500 scholarship program offered by the state.96 Yet Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Locke v. Davey, delivered over the angry
dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas, made clear that the current Court
will leave the resolution of such issues to the political branches.97 Given
the 7-2 vote in Locke, the arrivals of Roberts and Alito on North Capitol
Street would make no difference, although an additional Bush nominee
replacing the secularist John Paul Stevens might portend more
revolutionary shifts of doctrine.
Similarly, it is impossible to estimate the shelf life of the Court’s twin—
and many would say incoherent—decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU98
and Van Orden v. Perry99 regarding government-supported displays of
religion in the public square. In these two cases, the Court struck down a
publicly supported display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky, but
upheld one in Texas. Justice Kennedy was in dissent in McCreary County,
and in the plurality in Van Orden. Given that he is the new swing Justice,
this means that Van Orden, which gave local governments far greater
leeway to place religious iconography in public places, probably represents
the wave of the future. One can nevertheless imagine a wide range of
different possible directions for Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
doctrine, depending on remaining opportunities for President Bush to make
appointments before his term expires in January 2009, the results of the
2006 elections (which might shift control of the Senate or weaken the
Republican majority there), and, perhaps most importantly, the winner of
the 2008 presidential election. It is worth noting, however, that a
Democratic appointment replacing Justice Stevens in 2009 would likely
preserve the current status quo that features Kennedy as the swing Justice,
while replacing Stevens with a strong conservative would have a much
more significant impact on the jurisprudence of the religion clauses, and
much else besides.
It is interesting to contrast the Rehnquist Court’s decisions on religion
with its decisions in the area of sexual autonomy: gay rights and abortion.
In the former area, but not the latter, the Court largely supported the
constitutional agenda of religious conservatives. We note in passing that if
the new Supreme Court upholds the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003,100
the practical effect will mostly be symbolic, as very few of these procedures
are performed each year.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey101 did far more to limit Roe v. Wade102 and the
practical scope of abortion rights.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-16 (2004).
Id. at 720.
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003).
510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The victory of religious conservatives on religious issues but not on
issues of sexual autonomy makes considerable sense. The country has
become increasingly overtly religious but at the same time it has become
increasingly tolerant of homosexuality. The country is not ready to
embrace gay marriage—this is still a winning wedge issue for
Republicans—but in a relatively short period of time the idea that
individual states might create civil unions for gay couples has traveled from
the positively unthinkable and revolutionary to the politically possible.
Indeed, while announcing his support for the Musgrave Amendment
banning same-sex marriage, President Bush admitted in an interview that he
did not object to states creating civil unions for gay couples.103 In addition,
a consistent majority of the public does not wish to see Roe overturned (nor,
as we have explained earlier, do many members of the Republican Party).
Put another way, the conservative revolution in the federal courts has
adopted and promoted some of the goals of social and religious
conservative movements but not others. It has promoted greater public
support for religion but not the substantive constitutional demands of
religious conservatives in the area of sexuality. This is an example of a
larger point: Social movements succeed in changing the Constitution when
they gain friends in the courts, but their interests are usually balanced with
and coopted by other interests (including political parties) with which they
associate.104 Religious and social conservatives have been an important
part of the winning coalition of Republicans in the past three decades, and
they have been rewarded with judicial appointments friendly to their
aims—Justices Scalia and Thomas in the Supreme Court and Judge Michael
McConnell in the lower federal courts. But the vector sum of forces within
the Republican Party has tended to push an agenda of tax cuts, selective
deregulation, and increased presidential power over many of the cultural
issues that are particularly important to religious and social conservatives.
This brings us to what we believe is the most important part of the Bush
Administration’s constitutional agenda—the enhancement of presidential
power. We believe that both the Roberts and Alito nominations—and much
else—can best be understood by reference to this overarching goal. This
could not, we believe, have been easily predicted in 2001, when we wrote
our original article. It appears glitteringly obvious now, five years later.
In discussing the causes of constitutional change, we have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of contingency. Nowhere is contingency more
important than when new issues suddenly emerge on the constitutional
agenda, propelled either by new social movements, changes in technology,
disaster, or war. Few in 1969 would have predicted that abortion would
move to the center of the Court’s attention in only four short years. Even
103. See Gary Langer, A Question of Values, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19; Bush’s
Gay
Union
Stance
Irks
Conservatives,
MSNBC.com,
Oct.
26,
2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6338458/.
104. See generally Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change)
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 27 (2005).
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more to the point, we did not anticipate in the middle of 2001 that the key
constitutional issue of our time would come to be national security,
particularly executive power.
The final version of our 2001 piece on the conservative constitutional
revolution went to the printers on September 7, 2001. Needless to say, like
most Americans, we did not predict 9/11, the War on Terror, and the
Afghanistan and Iraqi wars. The September 11 attacks have changed a
great deal in American politics, whether or not that change has resulted in
the right policies for responding to the threat of terrorism. Whatever else
may be said about September 11, it was the political answer to George W.
Bush’s (and Karl Rove’s) prayers. In one instant, there was no longer any
serious questioning about the legitimacy of his presidency due to the
shenanigans in Florida and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore.105 Instead, Bush’s early leadership following September 11 helped
identify what would soon become a consistently winning issue for the Bush
Administration and its political allies—the need for strong executive
leadership in what was quickly christened the “War on Terror.”
This war was the answer to a genuine dilemma facing the Republican
Party (not to mention George W. Bush). For many years leading up to
America’s victory in the Cold War, the Republican Party kept its disparate
and warring factions together by a common commitment to low taxes,
deregulation of business, and anticommunism. This remained true even
after social and religious conservative movements joined the coalition in the
1970s and 1980s. But the demise of communism following 1989 was a
mixed blessing for the Republican Party. It gained its central goal of
defeating the communist menace but lost a conspicuous foreign enemy to
fight against. Just a year after George H. W. Bush’s triumphal war in Iraq,
Bill Clinton won the presidency by promising “peace dividends” and
reminding voters that “it’s the economy, stupid.” Bush père seemed
surprisingly unsuited to the domestic politics of a post-Cold War world.
Clinton, of course, trounced Bob Dole in 1996, and Al Gore won a plurality
of the vote in 2000 (and, in the eyes of many, the election as well). Many
observers attributed Bush’s victory as a repudiation of the “immorality”
attached to the Clinton Administration. Foreign policy seemed distant from
most Americans’ minds.
The early months of George W. Bush’s presidency were difficult in many
respects. With anger over the 2000 election still festering, Bush began
without the traditional “honeymoon” period; he enjoyed the support of only
55.8% of the American public in the first six months of his presidency that
ended on July 19, 2001.106 This level of support placed him in the fortyninth percentile of American Presidents since Harry Truman.107 In early
105. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
106. Jeffrey M. Jones, Bush Finishes 19th Quarter in Office on Low Note, Gallup Poll,
Oct.
21,
2005,
http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=19363,
available
at
http://www.astrid-online.it/Cartella-p/Elezioni-U/GALLUP-NS_21_10_05.pdf.
107. Id.

BALKIN AND LEVINSON

130

10/20/2006

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

June 2001, Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party in
disgust at the new Administration’s rightward turn. Jefford’s defection cost
the Republicans control of the Senate, which, among other things, made
confirmation more difficult for Bush’s federal court appointees.
As already noted, September 11 transformed the political calculus,
including George Bush’s stature and legitimacy. Bush skyrocketed to an
eighty-six percent approval rating in the first full quarter following
September 11, which placed him in the ninety-ninth percentile of first term
Presidents.108 Equally important, the September 11 attacks created a new
idea and a new ideal for the Republican faithful to rally around: keeping
America safe from the threat of terrorism.
One can be confident that any president, including Al Gore, would have
emphasized the need for executive power in circumstances like the
aftermath of September 11. After all, Bill Clinton was no shrinking violet
in his assertion of unilateral power to send American troops to Haiti, to
engage in war in the South Balkans, or to fire American missiles at Sudan
and Afghanistan. As James Madison might have predicted, almost all
Presidents seem devoted to the aggrandizement of their institutional power
once they obtain the office. This suggests that Presidents—especially
during times of war—will seek to nominate judges, and especially Justices,
who will be sympathetic to their assertions of executive power.
But Madison might also have predicted that members of Congress would
be equally eager to have their institution serve as a “check and balance” to
such presidential ambitions. As Madison famously put it, the separation of
powers guaranteed that “[t]he interest of the man . . . [would] be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place,”109 so that congressmen and
senators would, by the nature of their offices, resist incursions into their
power and check presidential aggrandizements that might disturb the
constitutional system and threaten liberty.
Here Madison was utterly wrong.
A central feature of American constitutionalism not fully understood by
the founders is that party loyalty can trump institutional interest when the
party is relatively ideologically homogenous. In some ways the framers did
understand this possibility inasmuch as they regarded political parties as
“factions” potentially united to serve “private interests” against the “public
interest.” A truly virtuous person would avoid the blandishments of party
and would stand above such attachments. For better and, possibly, for
worse, this is simply not the way that American politics developed. As
Daryl Levinson has pointed out, the Madisonian hope that the ambition of
the person would be tied to the ambition of the office—and thus that
Republican congressmen would check a Republican President during time

108. Id.
109. The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
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of war—has proved unavailing.110 The separation of powers does the least
work in checking the misuse of power when one party has won the
“constitutional trifecta”—that is, it controls all three branches of
government.111 Thus, it has become part of the Republican constitutional
agenda—and not only the President’s agenda—to give the President all the
tools and discretion he needs to prosecute the War on Terror
successfully.112 It should go without saying that part of that constitutional
agenda includes plenary power by Congress to pass legislation it deems
helpful to conducting the War on Terror—that is, as long as it assists the
President and does not interfere with his asserted prerogatives as
Commander-in-Chief. Indeed, in a short space of time, the scope of
presidential authority to combat terrorism has become perhaps the central
constitutional question of our era.
V. THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE STATE
One of the most important developments in American constitutionalism
is the gradual transformation of the United States into a National
Surveillance State. This National Surveillance State is characterized by a
significant increase in government investments in technology and
government bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic security and (as
its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the
devices that the digital revolution allows.
Government agencies like the NSA can collect, collate, and analyze vast
amounts of conversations, e-mails, and Internet traffic between individuals
within the United States and foreign countries, and, it now appears,
substantial amounts of such communications within the United States.113 A
series of technological developments have made this data collection and
data mining possible.
High-speed computers, lower costs of

110. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 915, 956-58 (2005).
111. On the importance of the “constitutional trifecta,” see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore
and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407, 1455 (2001).
112. Which party controls Congress tells us much about the degree of genuine oversight
of the executive branch that Congress is likely to conduct. The presence or absence of such
oversight is an essential part of our “constitutional order,” and one cannot be at all confident
that Congress will behave in a way that we believe the Constitution demands. As we note
above, there is little reason to expect adequate oversight in “unified” governments where the
same party—Republican or Democratic—control both the presidency and Congress.
Although Yale political scientist David Mayhew is skeptical that “divided” governments
produce less important legislation than “unified” ones, he concedes that the degree of
oversight is directly related to whether the government is “unified” or “divided.” See David
R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern 223-26 (2d ed. 2002).
113. See Charles Babington & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Seeks to Clarify Testimony On
Spying, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2006, at A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/28/AR2006022801587.html; Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive
Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA Today, May 11, 2006, at 1A, available at 2006
WLNR 8071299; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove,
Officials Report, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 24919471.
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telecommunication and computer storage, and complex mathematical
algorithms allow computers to “recognize” patterns in speech, telephone
contact information, e-mail messages, and Internet traffic that might
indicate possible terrorist or criminal activity. Government officials can
combine all of this information with vast amounts of consumer data
collected by the government and the private sector. Various private
companies now employ business models based on collecting, collating, and
analyzing consumer data from a wide variety of sources; they then sell this
data and analysis to other private parties and to the government.
The National Surveillance State arose from a number of different features
whose effects are mutually reinforcing. The most obvious causes are
changes in how nations conduct war and promote their national security.
As Philip Bobbitt has eloquently explained, the geopolitical demands of war
and foreign policy often provide the impetus for changes in domestic
political arrangements, because the way that the state faces the world
outside is often reflected in the way that it faces its citizens.114
With the United States a likely target for future terrorist attacks,
electronic surveillance, data mining, and the construction of what Daniel
Solove has called “digital dossiers,”115 have become increasingly important.
Terrorist organizations can form loosely connected, geographically
amorphous collectivities that present formidable threats to the United
States; they can employ weapons of mass destruction or, as in the case of
the September 11 attacks, relatively low-tech weaponry with suicidal zeal.
New digital communications technologies allow terrorist organizations to
band and disband at will, hide their identities, encrypt their
communications, transfer funds and resources, and gather allies in many
different places around the world. Traditional, geographically organized
adversaries in the form of nation-states have fixed locations that the United
States can threaten in order to deter attacks. Terrorist organizations,
because they lack such fixed addresses, cannot be similarly deterred. They
must be stopped as soon as their activities and plans can be identified. This
necessitates constant surveillance and processing of vast amounts of
information because of the expected costs of making even a single mistake
in failing to identify a threat.
We caution, however, that the National Surveillance State is not simply a
product of the September 11 attacks. Nor is it necessarily a product of war.
To begin with, it is by no means clear that the “War on Terror” is a war in
the traditional sense. It is not even a long-term engagement with a small
group of identifiable adversaries as in the Cold War. Rather, what people
now call the “War on Terror” is a sustained set of interlocking strategies for
dealing with new forms of global threats and new technologies of attack by

114. See Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History
69-74 (2002).
115. Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information
Age 1-2 (2004).
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a host of different organizations, some sponsored by nation-states, and
others acting more or less on their own.116
Equally important to the rise of the National Surveillance State are new
technologies of surveillance, data storage, and computation that arrived on
the scene in the latter part of the twentieth century. These would have been
produced whether or not the United States was attacked on September 11,
2001. As soon as these technologies became widely available, it was
inevitable that governments would seek to employ them, both to enjoy their
advantages and to counter the dangers of the same tools in private hands.
In particular, the Internet and digital information technologies have
created new opportunities for crime and new vulnerabilities for the general
public, for financial institutions, and for government itself. The digitally
networked environment makes possible new types of crimes, like breaches
of electronic security and electronic identity theft, while facilitating more
traditional crimes like embezzlement, theft, and conspiracy. The digital age
has altered the technologies of crime and, concomitantly, the way that the
state can respond to crime.
Focusing on war as the primary cause of the National Surveillance State
overlooks the fact that surveillance technologies that help the state track
down terrorists can also be used to track and prevent domestic crime. Once
the state has these technologies in place for collecting foreign intelligence,
it can use the same technologies to protect its people from crime, attacks on
the information infrastructure, and virtually any other domestic problem.
After the state compiles data on its citizenry—or purchases it from the
private sector—it can use the information to promote a wide range of
governmental policies, ranging from the delivery of health care services to
tracking down deadbeat dads and people who have failed to pay their
license renewal fees and state property taxes. Increased use of information
in governance makes governments and those who control information flows
more powerful, which makes the information ever more valuable to
governments; this causes governments to invest even more heavily in the
collection, storage, and collation of data. These tendencies are spurred on
by technological advances that increasingly lower the cost of
telecommunications, surveillance technology, data storage, and
computation power. Thus, although the transition to the National
Surveillance State has been accelerated by the September 11 attacks and the
Bush Administration’s proclaimed War on Terror, its rise is overdetermined
by a host of different technological and bureaucratic imperatives.
The National Surveillance State poses two distinct dangers to our
constitutional system. The first danger is that the Executive’s power to
conduct war will displace the area previously assumed to fall within the

116. For important critiques of the rhetoric of “war” in this regard, see Philip B.
Heymann, Terrorism Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War 6 (2003) and Bruce
Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism
(2006).
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criminal justice system. Increasingly, the Executive can choose to treat
dangers within the United States as matters of war and national security
rather than as matters of criminal justice. The latter, but not the former,
come with a series of traditional civil liberties protections that constrain and
check the Executive. In this way, the government can create a parallel law
enforcement structure that routes around the traditional criminal justice
system with its own rules for surveillance, apprehension, interrogation,
detention, and punishment. Because it is not subject to the oversight and
restrictions of the criminal justice system, the government may be
increasingly tempted to use this parallel system for more and more things.
It may argue that the criminal justice system is outmoded and insufficiently
flexible to deal with the types of security problems it now faces. However,
the more that the government routes around the criminal justice system, the
more it institutionalizes the parallel system as the method of choice.
The current controversy over warrantless domestic surveillance provides
an example. By acting outside of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978117 and telecommunications privacy laws, the government makes it
far more likely that the information it gleans from monitoring phone calls
(and data mining phone records) cannot be used to justify traditional judgeissued warrants, and the evidence produced cannot be introduced in
ordinary criminal trials.118 Similarly, evidence derived from coercive
interrogations or interrogations involving cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment normally cannot be introduced in ordinary criminal trials. Thus,
if the government attempts to use the criminal justice system after having
used the parallel system, it faces a significant disadvantage in its ability to
prove its case. Given this disadvantage, the government may increasingly
choose to expand and defend the parallel system of intelligence,
interdiction, incarceration, interrogation, and punishment.119 As the
117. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
118. The Department of Justice, however, has not conceded this point. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Responses to Joint Questions from House Judiciary Committee Minority Members
14
(Mar.
24,
2006),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/responses/dojnsaminresp32406.pdf
(“Because
collecting foreign intelligence information without a warrant does not violate the Fourth
Amendment and because the Terrorist Surveillance Program is lawful, there appears to be no
legal barrier against introducing this evidence in a criminal prosecution.”).
119. The government’s treatment of Jose Padilla—whom it detained for several years
without any of the protections of the Bill of Rights—may provide a second example.
Although the government initially claimed that Padilla had plotted to detonate a radioactive
“dirty bomb” in Chicago, he was finally indicted for an unrelated conspiracy. See
Superceding Indictment, United States v. Hassoun et al., (No. 04-60001-CR) (S.D. Fla. Nov.
17, 2005) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Associated Press, Padilla Indictment
Avoids
High
Court
Showdown,
MSNBC.com,
Nov.
22,
2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10152846; Mark Sherman, Padilla Indicted After Three
Years, ABC News, Nov. 23, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/print?id=1340398. The
government may have tried to keep Padilla out of the criminal justice system as long as it
could in part because much of the evidence of a bombing plot was probably illegally
obtained from the perspective of the criminal justice system. For example, it may have been
elicited through coercive interrogation or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of
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methods of war encroach on the criminal law, and the needs of national
security encroach on domestic criminal law enforcement, the government
will be increasingly tempted to take the path of least resistance—and least
accountability—and choose to treat individuals within the United States as
subject to intelligence, interdiction, incarceration, interrogation, and
punishment under the aegis of national security rather than criminal
procedure.
The second danger of the National Surveillance State is not that the
criminal justice system will increasingly be displaced by a parallel track of
military and national security enforcement, but that the criminal justice
system will become increasingly like the parallel track. That is, it will lose
the civil liberties protections, checks and balances, and oversight by
independent actors (e.g., judges) that we normally associate with the
criminal process in the United States. Consider the NSA’s warrantless
surveillance program once again. Suppose that courts would hold that
domestic surveillance outside of the requirements of FISA cannot be
introduced at criminal trials. If so, then why not simply ask Congress to
amend FISA so that the NSA’s searches are legal and the evidence can be
admitted in criminal trials? After all, the federal courts have given
Congress a fairly wide berth to determine how to draw the boundaries of
foreign intelligence.120 A second example is the Bush Administration’s
increasing use of indefinite detention of material witnesses, administrative
warrants, and National Security Letters. The government already had
authority to detain individuals as material witnesses—the Bush
Administration simply used the power more frequently and for longer
periods than people expected. Administrative warrants were already
authorized in a small number of cases before September 11; the 2001 USA
PATRIOT Act expanded their use and authorized a system of National
Security Letters that the FBI has employed with increasing frequency in a
wide variety of situations with only remote connections to the goal of
preventing terrorism.121 These strategies modify previous understandings
of the criminal justice system and allow the Executive to detain suspects
and engage in surveillance without the usual civil liberties limitations,
checks, and oversight.
persons held by the CIA or other intelligence operations. See Phillip Carter, Tainted by
Torture, Slate, May 14, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100543/. Similar problems may
complicate even the conspiracy prosecution that the federal government finally brought. See
Warren Richey, “Alternative” CIA Tactics Complicate Padilla Case, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Sept. 15, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0915/p01s02-usju.html.
120. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002); see also
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butenko,
494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1973). But cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (noting the
importance of judicial scrutiny to safeguard against illegal domestic surveillance of persons
not associated with foreign countries).
121. Dan Eggen, FBI Sought Data on Thousands in ‘05, Wash. Post, May 2, 2006, at
A04,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/01/AR2006050101388.html.
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The NSA’s data mining programs suggest yet another example of this
trend. Although—as far as we are aware—the NSA employs its data
mining operations solely to identify threats to national security, there is no
reason in theory why the same technologies could not be harnessed to aid
domestic criminal law enforcement. Once databases of all phone calls
made in the United States are compiled, they can be combined with
consumer data derived from private organizations like ChoicePoint (to take
only one well known example). This allows governments to produce rich
digital dossiers that might be employed either by the nation’s national
security agencies or its criminal law enforcement divisions.
The
information that is useful to the one will increasingly be useful to the other.
Governments, knowing this, have incentives to modify existing privacy
restrictions so that they can employ data mining for more and more features
of everyday law enforcement. As William M. Arkin wrote recently in his
Washington Post weblog, “[T]omorrow, there could be an illegal immigrant
tax and pay record monitoring tip-off system, a sexual predator and
pornography attention algorithm, a drug dealing and buying behavior
inconsistency profile.”122 If the information gleaned from the government’s
national security wing is transferred over to its law enforcement wing (and
shared with state and local law enforcement authorities), criminal law
enforcement will be transformed into increasing surveillance of ordinary
Americans to prevent not only the most serious threats to national security,
but also everyday crimes, including perhaps misdemeanors and
administrative infractions. Finally, the government will be tempted to
move increasingly from investigation and arrest after crimes occur to
surveillance, prevention, and interception before crimes occur. After all, if
we can keep our citizens safe from Al Qaeda using the most advanced
information technologies, which will become increasingly inexpensive to
use and implement, why not use the same technologies to protect our
citizens from ordinary crimes, whether major or minor? And if we can use
the tools of the National Surveillance State to prevent threats to national
security from coming to fruition, why not use the same technologies to head
off criminals, both dangerous and petty, before they have a chance to act?
The twin dangers of national security displacing the criminal justice
system and the criminal justice system becoming increasingly like the
national security system are not simply inevitable consequences of the
September 11 attacks. They are long-term tendencies driven by the
confluence of technological advances, the changing crime scene, and
America’s foreign policy and national security interests. These changes are
not limited to how the state conducts war, at least as war has been
traditionally conceived. Rather, these changes in technology threaten to

122. William M. Arkin, A Seamless Surveillance Culture, Early Warning blog, Wash.
Post,
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/05/a_seamless_surveillance
cultur.html (May 15, 2006, 08:22 EST).
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transform the ways that democratic governments interact with their
citizenry on a routine basis.
We do not doubt that similar concerns have led the Bush Administration
to cut corners on international and domestic law concerning detention and
interrogation of prisoners. However, the development of increasingly
elaborate systems of surveillance is far more characteristic of the kinds of
government policy necessitated by technological change. Torture and
prisoner mistreatment have been around as long as warfare itself—what is
new is the harnessing of digital technologies to produce a Leviathan-like
information processing machine.
From a constitutional perspective, the National Surveillance State will
probably shift institutional power and authority from Congress to the
presidency. There is no serious possibility of completely forestalling this
shift, which, after all, can be said to have been underway at least since the
beginning of World War II. Indeed, the political sociologist Harold
Lasswell first defined the “garrison state” in 1941 as one in which “the
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.”123 By
1961, in his famous “farewell address,” President Eisenhower, himself one
of the most distinguished military officers of World War II, warned his
fellow citizens of the potential dominance of a “military-industrial
complex” that was transforming American politics.124 Rather, the only
questions are how much more executive aggrandizement will occur and
whether new institutions can be adapted to prevent the inevitable risks that
will accompany the shift toward ever-increasing surveillance.125
The first is the risk of harm to individual privacy and civil liberties. The
second is the inevitable dangers of concentrating too much power in one

123. Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 Am. J. Sociology 455, 455 (1941).
124. It is certainly worth pondering Eisenhower’s words, delivered some forty-five years
ago:
[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms
industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic,
political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the
Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet
we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and
livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial [sic]
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and
military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
security and liberty may prosper together.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American
People, 60 Pub. Papers 1035, 1038 (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001.htm.
125. For a readable introduction to some new forms of surveillance, see Jeffrey Rosen,
The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (2004).
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branch of government without accountability and transparency. The third
risk, which stems from the second, is the danger of informational insularity,
in which the executive is unable or unwilling to acknowledge and assimilate
new information that requires it to reshape and redirect its plans. Some
years ago Irving Janis coined the term “groupthink” to refer to institutional
tendencies toward insularity, and recent work in behavioral psychology has
reinforced these concerns.126 One advantage of a system of separated
powers, especially if one of the competing institutions includes strong
individuals from the opposition political party, is that the other branches,
because of their natural competition, consistently force new information and
impose hard-learned lessons on the others. From this perspective, a
constitutional system is also a system of information gathering and a system
of learning. But if one branch—the presidency—need pay no attention to
the others, or can thoroughly dominate them through appeals to party
loyalty, as was largely the case during the first six years of the Bush
Administration, then it will not be forced to confront the recalcitrant
information about the world that the other branches have the incentive and
the opportunity to provide.
The National Surveillance State arises from a real concern: the enhanced
need for processing information about the outside world and reacting
appropriately to it given the changes in foreign affairs and warfare. The
danger is that the concentration of power in this new state will prove
particularly inept at processing the relevant information. The intelligence
failures in the run-up to the Iraq war are an obvious and worrisome
example.
The need for the National Surveillance State arises from war and foreign
policy, but its consequences will reverberate throughout domestic politics.
Courts will play a role in determining the boundaries of this emerging
constitutional construction, but for the most part, we predict, they will
legitimate and bless it, much as they legitimated and blessed the
administrative state, the welfare state, and the national security state in
previous years. As we shall note below, there is no particular reason to
view the debate over the National Surveillance State as truly “partisan.”
For better or for worse, there may be no meaningful division between the
Democratic and Republican Parties with regard to the imperatives for, and
the broad outlines of, the National Surveillance State. The difference
between the two major political parties, we think, will consist of fairly
marginal disputes about how best to implement the new forms of
governance, what kinds of accountability and transparency mechanisms are
built into the new institutional framework, and how the balance between
efficacy and civil liberties is struck. Still, even if some form of the National

126. See Irving L. Janis, Group Think: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and
Fiascoes 7-9 (2d ed. 1983); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and
Governance, in Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making 567-84 (Derek J.
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004).
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Surveillance State is in our future, a great deal turns on the details of what
kind of state it becomes.
Two observations are worth making. First, like all Presidents, Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton sought to enhance their
powers in military and foreign affairs, including controversial and more-orless unilateral uses of the U.S. forces. But they almost certainly did not
select Supreme Court Justices based on the current agenda of enhancing
presidential power to fight terrorism. Therefore, it is less surprising than it
should have been that a Supreme Court stocked almost entirely by
Republican-appointed Justices, and led by Justice O’Connor, rejected the
current administration’s most extreme claims of executive power in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld.127 Like Roe v. Wade—another decision that was not on the
radar screen of the Presidents when they appointed the Justices who decided
it—the lineup of Justices in Hamdi cross-cut partisan and ideological
divisions. Clinton appointee Stephen Breyer joined with Reagan appointee
Sandra Day O’Connor to legitimate the President’s power to detain enemy
combatants, offering a broad reading of the September 18, 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).128 Republican
appointees Justices Scalia and Stevens vigorously objected, arguing that
Congress could not do this unless it officially suspended the writ of habeas
corpus.129
In contrast to his predecessors, President Bush did have the War on
Terror very much in mind when he made two Supreme Court appointments
following the Hamdi decision, and he was able to replace two of the
Justices who formed the Hamdi130 plurality. His choices reflect this. Just a
week before his nomination, then-Judge John G. Roberts joined in the D.C.
Circuit’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, which upheld the President’s power
to try suspected enemy combatants before military tribunals and rejected the
application of the Geneva Conventions to the constitution of these
tribunals.131 That decision seemed to send a clear signal to the White
House that Roberts could be trusted to uphold presidential prerogatives.
Likewise, Samuel Alito had been one of the architects of the presidential
“signing statement strategy” that embraced the broadest possible conception
of unilateral presidential power.
As it turned out, however, the addition of Roberts and Alito was not
sufficient to change the result in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld132 when it reached
the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and held that the
President’s military commissions were not authorized by AUMF and were
contrary to the Geneva Conventions. As one might have predicted, Justice
Alito supported the President’s basic position, joined by Justices Scalia and
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).
See id. at 509-39.
Id. at 554-79.
Id. at 509.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
126 S. Ct. 2749
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Thomas. Chief Justice Roberts, who had joined the D.C. Circuit’s decision
below, recused himself; but even had he participated, that would not have
been enough to carry the day for the Bush Administration.
This brings us to our second point. The National Surveillance State,
which we believe is gradually emerging, has been constructed during a
period in which Republicans hold all the levers of power. But we do not
regard it as purely a Republican product. To be sure, President Bush has
taken a strong—we would even say objectionably strong—position in favor
of executive secrecy and domestic surveillance. But one should not forget
that the Clinton Administration had already been concerned with terrorism
as an emerging phenomenon, both from international sources, as in the
World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 and the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole in October 2000, and domestically, as in the Oklahoma City bombing
of April 1995. The Clinton Administration was quite willing to sacrifice
civil liberties in the process; in particular, it supported the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,133 which placed severe restrictions on
habeas remedies for criminal defendants. The Act was passed in April of
1996. By the end of July, following bombings at the Atlanta Olympic
games and the crash of TWA Flight 800 (neither of which, it ultimately
turned out, had anything to do with international terrorism), Clinton called
for yet more legislation. “We need to keep this country together right now.
We need to focus on this terrorism issue,” he stated during a July 30 news
conference.134 Interestingly enough given later developments, conservative
Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch expressed “some problems with the
President’s proposals to expand wiretapping.”135 Indeed, the Clinton
impeachment and the weakening of presidential power that almost
inevitably accompanies divided government136 may only have delayed by a
few years a longer-term concentration of power in the Executive to deal
with emerging problems of war and national security, regardless of who
inhabited the White House.
Moreover, whichever party held the White House during the September
11 attacks would be compelled to show its commitment to responding to the
threat of terrorism, accelerating the development of the National
Surveillance State. Following the September 11 attacks, politicians of both
parties rushed to pass the USA PATRIOT Act, which contained a list of
reforms that law enforcement officials had sought for some time, but which
had been held back by a combination of legislative inertia and concerns
over civil liberties. The September 11 attacks provided both intelligence
and law enforcement bureaucracies the opportunity to propose these

133. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
134. President Wants Senate to Hurry with New Anti-terrorism Laws, CNN.com, July 30,
1996, http://www.cnn.com/US/9607/30/clinton.terrorism/.
135. Id.
136. Of course, the impeachment itself can be understood only against the background of
a highly partisan divided government.
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changes anew in the political climate most favorable for their passage. If
the Democrats had controlled the presidency after the 2000 election, they
would have felt every bit as compelled to demonstrate their seriousness
about responding to the threat of terrorism—as well as the growing threats
to cybersecurity. In responding to the September 11 attacks, Democrats
would have been egged on by the Republicans, who would still have held at
least one house of Congress, and possibly both. The Democrats would
likely have had strong incentives to get tough on terrorism, and they would
be repeatedly pressed by Republicans, who would stand ready to accuse
them of weakness at the merest hint of vacillation. Thus, a military
campaign against the Taliban, efforts to sweep up Al Qaeda operatives, and
many of the USA PATRIOT Act’s reforms would probably have occurred
under either party’s leadership.
Some details, we think, would probably have been quite different. It is
likely that a President Gore would not have been so hasty to invade Iraq.
Moreover, judging from previous political history, the Democrats would
likely have a larger contingent of supporters concerned about possible
dangers to civil liberties; this would be reflected not only in their
institutional reforms and executive actions but also in Democratic judicial
appointments. (Even so, the Republican coalition contains a significant
libertarian strain that also cares about government surveillance. As the
opposition party, they might have used this issue to attack a Democratic
Administration.) As is true today, the two parties would have had to
approach the American public with their respective visions for how to deal
with the threat of terrorism, and the Republicans would probably have tried
to outflank the Democrats as being tougher on national security and less
concerned about civil liberties.
Thus, the 2000 election probably did make a difference in terms of the
type of National Surveillance State that emerged. However, given that the
Republicans controlled the White House for this crucial period, we suspect
that the next Democratic President will likely retain significant aspects of
what the Bush Administration has done. There are two reasons for this.
The first is path dependency: Certain choices, once made, change political
realities in ways that are often difficult to undo without enormous cost. The
second is far more interesting (and perhaps more troubling): By staking out
such aggressive positions on executive power and by changing expectations
about what Presidents can do and can keep secret, the Bush Administration
has created a wide space for future Presidents of both parties. Future
Presidents may find that they enjoy the discretion and lack of accountability
created by Bush’s unilateral gambits. Hence, they will not waste much time
or political capital trying to expose what Bush did while in office. To the
contrary, they may try to take advantage of the climate of secrecy and
presidential unilateralism that he created. After all, blowing the whistle on
what the previous Administration did makes it more difficult for them to do
similar things in the future. Moreover, if future Presidents appear to be
even a little less aggressive than the press has portrayed Bush to be, they
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will appear quite moderate in comparison. Even a few concessions to
Congress and the judiciary will make them seem like devoted servants of
the rule of law in comparison to the reputation of the Bush Administration,
even though their powers are, from the perspective of an earlier time,
considerably augmented.
If the various misdeeds of the Bush
Administration ever come to light and come to justice, it will not be
because later Presidents expose them out of the goodness of their hearts, but
because Congress and the judiciary reassert themselves, and more people
risk their careers by leaking information. Without such courage, much of
what Bush and his subordinates did in the past several years will never be
fully known, and, indeed, Bush’s reputation will be burnished by later
Presidents following his example.
We may make a partial analogy with the regulatory and administrative
state and the national security state that arose between 1932 and 1952.
Democrats—the party that pushed for the growth of the regulatory and
administrative state—were in power during most of this period. They also
oversaw the conduct of World War II, which led to the formation of the
national security state. Thus, Democratic victories during these years
shaped the path of the administrative and national security state. Had
Republicans won elections during these years, they might have slowed
down the growth of these institutions, or diverted them to different agendas.
We note, however, that no Republican candidate for the presidency after
Alf Landon’s disastrous candidacy in 1936 ran on a platform of undoing the
New Deal and, following World War II, the Republicans proved just as
devoted to the anticommunist cause as the Democrats, if not more so. As
Stephen Skowronek has pointed out, a major historic function of Dwight
Eisenhower, the first Republican to take the presidency in twenty years, was
to consolidate the New Deal rather than to lead an attack on it, just as, from
the perspective of history, we can recognize Richard Nixon far more as a
consolidator of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society than a true critic.137
Because the Democrats controlled the government during a crucial period
of institution building and constitutional formation, they created a new
status quo and a new set of constitutional assumptions against which both
parties had to act. Although Ronald Reagan did attempt to transform
American politics in important ways, the basic institutions and
commitments of the New Deal and the welfare state escaped relatively
unscathed. The federal government grew under his watch, as it has under
George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. Although Bill Clinton
consolidated the Reagan Revolution, particularly through his support for
welfare reform, his 1996 prediction that “the era of big government is over”
proved evanescent. Big government is still with us, as evidenced by the
Bush Administration’s Medicare proposals, its No Child Left Behind Act,
and its budget-busting fiscal policies.

137. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make 46-47 (1993).
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The emerging National Surveillance State will be a long-term project of
American constitutional development in which both major parties will
participate, and many of its details are yet to be constructed. However, as a
result of the election of 2000, the Republicans got the first crack at
implementing many of its distinctive features, and this will shape the terrain
on which constitutional politics will be played in the future. The difference
between the parties—and thus their respective constitutional agendas—will
concern how particular balances will be struck between civil liberties and
national security and which stakeholders will be comparatively benefited.
The parties—and their respective judicial appointees—will disagree
heatedly about civil liberties and presidential power, but they will do so
within the basic parameters of the emerging National Surveillance State that
has been produced by the dialectical interactions of American politics.
Partisan differences do little to explain the now more than half-century
drift of power to wartime Presidents, and the future drift that we expect to
occur in the ongoing construction of the National Surveillance State.
Although the liberal wing of the Democratic Party is often associated with
strong support for civil rights, it was, after all, the “New Deal Court” that
upheld Franklin D. Roosevelt’s round-up of Japanese resident aliens and
Japanese Americans during World War II138 and, perhaps, even more to the
point, the questionable procedures of the “Nazi saboteurs trial” in Ex parte
Quirin.139 In hindsight, the Steel Seizure case,140 which limited executive
authority, must be understood as more the exception than the rule. Indeed,
from a contemporary perspective, what that case really established was that
where the President and Congress agree on a course of action in foreign
policy, the Court will offer almost no resistance to the resulting
concentration of power. Only where Congress has reasonably and clearly
not authorized aggressive uses of presidential power will the Court consider
stepping in. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,141 the Court
unanimously upheld, based on claims of national security, what some might
regard as the fiat taking of property, in part because it thought that Congress
supported what the President wanted to do. Democrats and Republicans
alike—from William J. Brennan to William H. Rehnquist—have all
supported increasing presidential power.
And although the next
Democratic appointments to the Supreme Court will no doubt draw the
lines differently from their Republican counterparts in some respects, they
too, will probably let the President do much of what he wants in
constructing a National Surveillance State to fight terrorism and prevent
crime, especially if they believe that Congress is willing to go along for the
ride.142 If we are correct that the National Surveillance State represents an
138. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
139. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
140. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
141. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
142. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in
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emerging constitutional regime, the two parties will mostly fight over the
contours of that regime, rather than the legitimacy of the regime itself.
Which party wins will make a considerable difference on some issues,
particularly those concerning civil liberties, but it will be a constitutional
struggle waged against a larger background of constitutional agreement
about the need for increased presidential power and increased surveillance.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF PARTISAN
ENTRENCHMENT
Our theory of partisan entrenchment offers one perspective on how
constitutional transformation occurs and how constitutional regimes are
forged. It views this process from the standpoint of changes in judicial
doctrine. But judicial doctrine must be understood against the background
of larger political forces that that doctrine either furthers or resists. As we
noted before, an important feature of constitutional change involves
constitutional constructions by the political branches that create regimes
like the New Deal, the national security state, the civil rights revolution of
the 1960s and, as we predict, the National Surveillance State. Thus, we
must distinguish two kinds of constitutional change. The first are changes
in governing regimes that involve the construction of new laws and
institutions by the political branches. The second are changes in judicial
doctrine, which are produced by courts appointed through the processes of
partisan entrenchment. The second kind of change—the major concern of
partisan entrenchment—must be understood against the first. All other
things being equal, courts tend to cooperate with and legitimate the
constitutional innovations of the political forces that entrench them;
conversely, they tend to resist the constitutional innovations of parties
opposed to those same forces.
The New Deal is a classic example of the interaction between partisan
entrenchment in the judiciary and constitutional construction by the
political branches. Between 1932 and 1936, the federal judiciary, which
had been entrenched by the Republican Party, mostly resisted the
Democrats’ proposed construction of the regulatory and welfare state,
striking down key legislation and rejecting Congress’s assertions of
constitutional power to regulate the national economy in the public interest.
After the Democrats repeatedly won congressional and presidential
elections, Roosevelt entrenched New Dealers in the federal judiciary.
Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court started to validate the construction
of the new regime; by the early 1940s, in United States v. Darby143 and
Wickard v. Filburn,144 a unanimous court stated, in effect, that Congress
would enjoy more or less carte blanche to regulate the national economy as
The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency 161-97 (Mark Tushnet
ed., 2005).
143. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
144. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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it saw fit. Once the Republican Party acquiesced to that change, the new
regime was firmly in place. The two parties then fought within the
parameters of the new constitutional regime. Subsequent Republican
appointees like John Marshall Harlan and Potter Stewart mostly respected
the New Deal settlement.
Partisan entrenchment, in short, has two equally important effects. It
helps hold off, for a time, proposed constitutional innovations by political
opponents when the entrenching party loses power, and it helps the party
that gains power create a cooperative judicial environment that is more
likely to legitimate its own constitutional innovations. Through judicial
appointments, parties can fight over the contours of the existing
constitutional regime, pushing it in one direction rather than another. Thus,
partisan entrenchment is particularly useful for explaining differences in
doctrinal developments with regard to issues where the parties disagree
strongly within a given constitutional regime. However, if a party is
mobilized toward constitutional change, stays in power long enough, and is
able to entrench enough like-minded jurists, it can do far more than nudge
the constitutional regime in its favored direction; it can substantially
reshape aspects of the constitutional order, and the judiciary that it appoints
and entrenches will help legitimate and rationalize those changes. In this
case, partisan entrenchment helps explain why judicial revolutions tend to
follow and bless political ones.

